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The  political  economy  model  followed  by  most  orthodox, 
mainstream American economists  before  1931  was classically  liberal, 
albeit occasionally with peculiarly American permutations.  After 
the United Kingdom suspended convertibility of sterling into gold 
(the  bedrock of orthodox financial  principles) in September 1931, 
American  economic  policymakers,  including  President  Hoover  and 
Eugene  Meyer,  governor  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  became , 
increasingly unorthodox in their prescriptions.  Although central 
planning measures of  the corporate state variety had manifested 
k  themselves vigorously but  briefly in policymaking circles during 
and immediately after  World War I, the  Harding, Coolidge, and early 
Hoover years were supposed to be a return to  prewar anormalcy,m  as 
the slogan associated with Barding's  campaign had it. 
The Federal Reserve Board led the way in Hoover's  rethinking 
of liberal orthodoxy in the crucial year running from the summer of 
1931  through the  spring  of  1932.  The  outcome  of  the Board's 
endeavors was an astonishing array of economic recovery initiatives 
that  scholars  have  classified,  retrospectively,  as  corporate 
statist in nature, involving direct federal government assistance 
to private  industry and  business-labor cooperation enforced .by 
governmental intervention.  These changes persisted and generally 
were  amplified during  the  ~oosevelt  administration's  first  year 
(=he  "First New Dealn);  the departure of Eugene Meyer as governor 
of the Board in early 1933 apparently did not diminish the Board's 
wlll~ngnoss  to pursue the planning initiatives undertaken during 
=he First New Deal.  By early 1934, it  became apparent that the 
33ard0s  szaff wanted  the Federal Reserve  to play  a role in the 
a=irn~r.rs=ration  of  industzial policy  in  rivalry with,  and with a 
v:gw  z3  evenzually  superseding,  the  parallel  role  of  the 
Rc=ms=,-uczlon  Finance Corporat~on. 
1,  in  the :autumn of  193.4,  the  Board's  plans  were  -  7 '-  =-,ere5  ~r,  =he  dire~:~~~  of  a  hybrid of  the Chicago Plan for 
100 percenz reserves banklng and what  we  now would call orthodox 
Seynes:ar.rsm  by  :he  ar.nauntemen= :hat  Marriner  Eccles, a former 
79  .  ,:a:  ~an~cr  and  an  asslszanz  to Treasury  Secretary Morgenthau,  . .  W-..,  --  -  s.;==eo5 Euaene  Blatic  as  g~vernor  of  the Board.  Lauchlin 
F..Cl. g  ---,-,.  a Hayard  Unlvers~zy  asso=late professor who had been one 
rC  -  =ze  loadzng  propontzrs  of  Keynes~an  doctrines  in  the United 
S=a:es  a=  =he time,  would move wxth Eccles from the Treasury to the  -  aoari's  Dlvlslon  of  Research  and  Statistics  to  supetvime  the 
d:v:,s:.oz0s  research  on  monetary  policy.  Eccles  obtained 
R=nsevel:'s  consenr  to  pursue  ln~t~arives  to  centralize  the 
r.=ne:ary  pawers of  the Federal Reserve System at  the Board. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmOUTLINE OF 
I.  Background  on  American  political  ecoaomy  models 
before 1931 (p. 11 . 
11.  How the Hoover adminlstIltion (and the Federal Reserve* 
Board)  altered  the  prevailing  classical  liberal  model,  1931- 
.  . 
early 1933 (p. 6)  . 
111.  What  the  Roosevelt  administration  (and  the Federal 
Reserve Board) did to alter Hoover's  schemes, early 1933-late  1933 
IV.  The  First New Deal takes on a corporatist coloration, 
with active Federal Reserve.Board assistance, late 1933-late 1934 
The  Board prepares for the coming  Marriner Eccles 
the  end  of  1934  and  becomes  a  hybrid  Chicago  Plan-orthodox 
'Keynesian  shop  (p. 47)  . 
VI.  Conclusion:  The Board absorbed and reflected the ideas 
currenr in Washingron ar  the rime  (p.. 53). 
Appendix:  What Herber:  Hoover and Marriner Eccles knew about 
economy 
References (p. 671 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmI.  Backgrotmd  on  amri  caq- polf  tical  mconw modelm 
before 1931. 
In  order  to  understand  properly  the  significance  of  the 
changes made  in the supervision and regrilation  of the financial 
services industry in the United States during the 19306, changes 
that have been undergoing almost constant reexamination since the 
early 1970s, it  is helpful to study the political economy models 
followed by  the White  House,  the Treasury, the Federal Reserve 
Board, and mainstream American opinion during the crucial years, 
1931-34.  The purpose of  this paper is to sketch the evolution of 
the  thought  of  the Board*  s staff  during  the early 1930s ih  the 
dire=:ion  of  extensive state involvement in the private economy. 
Tnar  evo1u:ion  was resisted  (albeit decreasingly) until 1934, at 
leas;  a:  the  regional  Federal  Reserve  Banks*  level.  Later 
---z-  -,..-,:t=s  bezween the Reserve Banks, their congressional sponsors, 
az= c=her feaeral bank supervisory and regulatory authorities, on 
-  -50  me  i,ar.a, and  Marrrnes  Eccles,  the  Board's  staff, and  the 
execx=rve  branch, on the o=her hand, cannot be understood properly 
w~=.L..z:z  some  background  informa:ion  regarding  the  legal, 
s-  ----,a:,  --  .  -  and economlz seasons for =he objections of those who 
res:s=eS  E==les' post-1534 pslicy iziziatives. 
p,a=)c3round 
Karktr-oriented  economc  policies  and  market-determined 
o-z==zncs, =haracter:s:~=  of  a  classical  liberal  world  view, 
orc~nasily  were  favored at  the center of  the American political 
I 
speczrum, from  the  drafting  of  the  Declaration of  Independence 
1 
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scale peacetime  interventions by  the federal government  in the 
operations  -of  private  markets  prior  to  Herbert  Hoover's 
.;  administration.  .  . 
However, the  British  and continental  European  experiences  with 
I  ,.  government all^ sponsored  or controlled  joint stock  corporations  and 
with explicit and covert bailout mechanisms for ucisting private 
corporations are quite old.  .The Bank  of England  (chartered in 
1694). the South Seas Company  (17111, and the East India Company 
(especially  after 1763)  were all involved in one or  another  kind of 
governmental bailout scheme  (see  A.  Smith  [I9761 ,  especially 
pp.  441-486 [Book  V,  Chapter iii]  1 .  There were limited attempts, 
made  by  Alexander Hamilton.  Henry Clay, and other proponents of 
1  large  gavernment  and  of governmental protection and  subsidy of 
enceqrise,  to  imitate  the  European  example  on  these  shores 
(Peterson  (19871  ;  editor's  notes  in  Lodge  [1904],  vol.  3, 
pp.  198-202).  But those explicit bailout. protection, and subsidy 
scnemes usually  were  of  limited  duration  and  eventually either 
faile5 or  were  abandoned, with the exceptions of  the protective 
-  ,ar;f  f  an=  =he Land gran:s  to railroad companies in the West during 
-  ,.it  sezand  half of  the a:nezcenth  cen~ury.  fmplicit subsidies 
pers2s:ed,  however.  as reflected in  the monetary standard debate 
conceralng gold versus silver interests.  creditors  (gold)  versus 
debtors  (greenbacks or  sliver)  ,  and  so on  (see generally 'Hicks  .  - 
119611, ~p.  54-95).  Nonzariff protection crept into the dominant 
m06el  or  political  economy  via  regulatory  agencies such as the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmInterstate Commerce Commission (established  -  ia 18781,  intended to 
regulate the railroads and, later, interstate trucking, that were 
soon  enough  mcapturedm'  by  their  regulated  industries 
(Schiming 119921 1. 
In  continental  Europe,  there  was  a  rising  fascination. 
-  throughout  the  . nineteenth  cexltury  with  central  plaru~ing  ,  with 
cooperation between government and industrialists, and with social 
movements that we now call corporate statism or even, in its  post- 
Mussolini manifestations, fascism.'  The political economy model 
of  the  corporate  state  is  rhetorically  inconsistent  with  the 
classical liberal model that dominated the United States until the 
1930s.  However, the principal distinctive feature of corporatism, 
an explicit partnership between large, incorporated  businesses and 
the  cen:ral  government,  rationally could  have  been  expected  to 
ernerae  as  a  distorted  version  of  the  American  system  whose 
=.ieore:lcal  origins and  lnstltutional structures were created by 
.  .  aarr.:l:or:  and whose strongest proponent was Clay.  The most complete 
real:za:lon  0.f this system was the governmental assistance to and 
-  ,a,  -.CC  ,, ,  prozec~ron  of  perperually  chartered  corporations under 
Rcp:tl:=an  a5m~nistra:rons  after =he Civil War  (see  Hicks [1961), 
p=.  3s - SS  1 .  The append:%  :o  :he  present  paper contains further 
d~stuss~on  of the attributes of and distinctions among the various 
maaels of  political economy. 
UP-b  -  v r  -1 
.-'  .no  f :=st  grand expezrmen:  w~tn  central planning in the  United 
Szates occurred in wartlme, during years that were intellectually 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmformative  for  many  principals  of the Hoover: .and Roosevelt 
administrations,  as  well  as  for  Keynes  (Skidelaky  (19861 , 
pp.  333-3531.  Initially,  central  planning  and  procurement  s - 
operations in the  United States for  the  Western allies during World 
War  I,  prior  to U.S  entry  into the war 'in April  1917, were. 
conducted by the British Treasury through  the  agency of J.P.  Morgan 
.  * 
6r  CO. and a banking syndicate arranged by Morgan.'  ,  After the u.s.. 
declaration  of war, the  War Finance Corporation (WTC)  was chartered 
to enable the federal government to centralize, coordinate, and 
fund the procurement and supply operations.  The WC8s  operations 
were  guided  by  an  advisory  commission  and  were  subject  to 
"preference listsm  (analogous to  .production quotas  and  output 
rationing) issued by the War Industries Board, whose chairman wan 
Brznard  Baruch  (see generally  Clarkson (1924  1  and Todd [1992b]  , 
pp.  23-24).  The four directors of the wFC appointed by President 
Wilson  included  W.P.G.  Warding,  then  a  member  of  the  Federal 
Rosezve  , Board,.  and Eugene Meyer. then a New York investment banker 
. bu:  lazrr governor (chainnanl of the Board and the first chairman 
of  :he  Recons=ruc: :on  Finance Corporation  (RFC) under president 
Haover  (Board  of  Governors, federal  Reserve Bulleth [19181, 
vol.  4, p.  364) .  Herberz Hoover, =he Belgian Relief coordinator 
f=r  humanztarian assistance a=  the outset of World War I  (Hoover  + 
!:?S:!,  pp.  152-2371, was appointed U.S. "Food Czarm (director  of 
:he  Food Administration in Washington) in May 1.917  and continued to 
work  in comparable capacities until 1920.  In those roles, Hoover 
conszan:ly  had to deal with the WFC, the War Industries  Board, and 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe War Trade Board  (ibid., pp.  240-2661.  - 
Hoover had  several unpleasant ucperiences w~th  the Federal 
Reserve Board during the Coolidge administration, under which he 
served  as  secretary  of  commerce  (see  generally Hoover  119521, 
pp. 2  -  28  1..  Generally, those experiences involved Hoover8  s attempt.  - 
to persuade the Board, whose governor (chairman)  then was Daniel. 
Crissinger, a friend of former President Warding; to  refrain from 
backing  the  United  Kingdom's  return  to  the  gold  standard  for 
scerling at  the prewar parity of $4.86  per pound  (1925)  and later 
to refrain from a U.S.  "easy moneym policy aimed at enabling the 
British authorities to maintain that parity, especially after the 
spring of 1927 (Hoover [1952]  , pp.  7-11)  . Hoover0  s later attitude 
toward the Federal Reserve System of the 1920s is summarized in  the 
followlng passage from his memoirs: 
.-- ,, ,singer  .  was  a  political  appointee  from  Marion,  Ohio, 
L--oF1  ,,,,,y  devoid of global economic or banking sense.  The other 
members of the Board, except Adolph Miller, were mediocrities, 
an= Governor  (Presidenz) [Benjamin]  Strong  (of the New York 
Reserve Bank) was  a men:al  annex to Europe.  .  I got  nowhere 
;arsx:ng  wi:h  them]  .  President Coolidge  insisted that the 
Board had been se:,up  by  Congress as an agency independent of 
:he  aam:nis:ra:ion,  and  =ha= we  had  no right to interfere. 
(Heaver [1952],  p.  9) 
-  .  .  t:.-.a,ry,  an  February  1929, Hoover  (by then the president- 
el?==.  persuaded Crass~nger's  suc=essor as governor of  the Board, 
undertake  course  "direct 
kn3wr.  as  jawboning" or  "moral suasionm)  to dissuade banks from 
leni~ng  funds for "speculat~ve  "  pu--poses  , but a general increase  ia 
=he'~~sr~~~:  rate or :he  New York Reserve Bank's  buying rate for 
bankers* acteptances (precursor  of  the modern federal funds rate) 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwould have been the preferable operat-1  fnstrument  (see  ibid., 
pp.  16-18;  Friedman and Schwartz [1963], pp.  254-2661,  A8 auly  in 
his  administration  as midyear  1929, Hower8s  iateractioam with 
...  Governor.  Young may have contributed substantially..to  the widening 
of the division that had existed since 1927 -tween  the  opiniom.  &f  - 
the Board and its staff  , on the One hand, and some of the.  Federal 
Reserve Banks, on the ,other  hand, on the issue of increasing the  . 
discount  rate,  a matter that ultimately is in the hands of  the 
Board. ' The Board acquiesced in Hoover's  preference for "direct  ' 
action,  a  form  of  credit  rationing,  while  the  evidence  of 
subsequent behavior, especially during early 1932, suggests that 
the  New York Reserve Bank preferred to  operate through an interest- 
rate target or other open-market methods (see  Friedman and Schwartz 
!1963], pp.  411-418; Epstein and Ferguson  (19841).  There is at 
least some evidence that the Board'  s staff, prior to  1931, did not 
disagree with  the New York Reserve Bank's  staff as much as some 
writers have contended regarding the potential efficacy of open- 
market  operations.  However,  substantial  differences  remained 
bezweer. =fie  Board under Hoover  (which  apparently was  trying to do 
Hoaver's  bidding) and  =he governor and directors of the New York 
Reserve Bank.  On this point,  compare  Hoover  ((19521,  pp,  16- 
19)  wrth Epstein and Ferguson  (1984). 
If.  How tbe Hoover adminimtration (mad the Faderr1 ~imrrvr  . 
Board)  altered  the  prevailing  clammical  liberal  modal, 
1931-early 1933, 
I 
As  already has been seen, favoring direct action over open- 
6 
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positivist  or  interventionist  political  economy  model  and  is 
inappropriate to, or at  least rhetorically inconsistent with, a 
classically  liberal  (negatf  ve  liberty)  model.  ~ut  too  many 
conclusions should not be drawn from this single piece of evidence 
regarding Hoover'  s political economy models.  Hoover8  s  (and the 
Board's)  actions  during  1931  and  for  the  remainder  of  his 
administration provide solid evidence of a growing trend, first in 
the direction of mildly interventionist measures such as jawboning 
industrialists, making currency support loans to foreign central 
banks, and organizing syndicates of bankers willing to lend funds 
to troubled banks..  Those trends subsequently emerged into full- 
blown governmental subsidies of the financial services industry, 
railroads, and  relief  operations for the states.  These latter 
measures began  to approach, but  were not yet  entirely consistent 
w~rf..,  :he  measures that  one would  expect  to find in a corporate 
szaze.  Thaz consis:ency  emersed later, during the First New Deal, 
but  even  then  was  not  always  attributable  to  conscious 
dcl:aoza=:vt  ~rxesses  . 
'I'xver's relazlons  w1:h  bankers  and  the  Federal  Reserve 
rearhe=  a  tcmlng poln:  n  Kay  1931.  Un=il  then,  apart  from 
ar=as:=r.a:  lezter-wrltlns  and other jawboning  exercises, Hoover did 
no:  zake md~rect  actionm  of  his own against banks or the Fed after 
=fie O==sStr 1929 crash.  f =  1s particularly noteworthy, in light of 
his s~bsequent  clashes wlth Meyer and the Board's  staff, that it 
was Hoover who selected Eugene Meyer as governor of  the Board in 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmSeptember 1930 after Roy Young resiw  to  become governor of  the 
Federal ~esemk  Blnk of ~oston  (E~&&~merve  RI~W  [1930], 
vol. 16, pp.  535, 615). 
On  May  7,  1931,  Hoover  learned  of  the dire  econ0~c  arrd 
political circumstances  in  Gernuny (analogous  to  those of  Russia in 
1993) and  apparently  promised  some  form  of  0.S.  assistance to 
support "the efforts of liberal  -minded  men in Germany,  Austria, and 
Eastern Europe to  sustain their representative  governments against 
the  political  forced  besetting  thema  (Hoover  (19521, p.  65). 
Around May  13, Hoover learned  .  of the extraordinary efforts being 
made  by  the  Federal Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  foreign central 
banks, and some of  the large New York banks to  prevent the collapse 
of the inte-=national interbank payments system that was threatened 
by a run on ihe gold and foreicn  exchange reserves of Kreditanstalt 
of  Vienna,  Ausrria's  largest  bank.  Subsequent  investigation 
persuaded Hoover that the European banking system was afloat on 8 
sea of  kzted bills of  exchange  id.,  p.  75) .  His distrustful 
a::itu5e  :oward  the Board at  that time is revealed in the following 
passa2e  from k:s  menalrs: 
0:  Kay  2O:h.  I  called in Federal Reserve Board officials to 
=:szuss  our  threazened economy.  They  intimated that  I war 
seeing ghosts so far as the Unlted States was concerned, and 
5ctlared tha:  no:k:ng  was oolng  on  that  they and our banks 
could not  easily handle.  (Ibad., p.  65) 
By June 10, Treasury Secretary Mellon, who also  was ex-of  f  icio 
cha:rnan  of  the Board, reversed his earlier position against U.S. 
official assistance to the European central banks as *s  on gold 
and forelgn exchange reserves spread into Germany  (ibid.,  p.  68). 
8 
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International Settlements.  The Resenre Banks lent $1.08  million 
for Austria on May 30, $2 million for  Hungary on June 19 (increased 
to $5 million on July a), $25 million for Germany on June 26, and 
5125  million  for  the  Bank  of  -gland  on  August  1  (Board of  : 
Governors,  .&mual  Reuor€  [19311  ,  pp.  12-13)  .  - 
On  June  5,  1931,  Thomas  Lamont,  a  J.P.  Morgan  partner, 
telephoned  Hoover  and  proposed  a  suspension  of  international 
payments for  World War I debts and reparations.  Hoover initially 
rejected Lamont8s  advice, but Lamont8s  files apparently show that 
Lamont told Hoover that, if he would adopt Morgan's  plan,  [Tlhe 
bank would hide its role and let Hoover take the credit:  'This is 
your  [Hoover's  1  plan and nobody else's'  (Chernow [19901,  p.  328)  . 
Fergusm (1984) has found evidence that Hoover's  diary entries for 
June  1431 subsequently were  altered  to make  it  appear that, in  . 
fa=:,  no one but  Hoover was responsible for this idea. 
Sy  June  21, Hoover.  adopted  the  Morgan  plan  and  issued  a 
szacemenc proposing a one-year  moratorium on all intergovernmental 
deb:  payments, succeeded on July 20 by  a proposal for a six-month 
s=ar.as::l:  'agreemen: among commertial bankers with respect to  bills 
cf  exchange  payable  by  banks  located  in  Central  and  Eastern 
European countries.  Hoover found the Board of  little assistance 
d..-.  --  -3s  this crisis, and he also found the New York Reserve Bank and 
zne  large commercial banks obstruc:ionist  with respect  to  the 
July  20  standstill agreement  (Hoover [19521,  pp. 73-80)  .  Hoover 
=hen asreed to encourage :he  Reserve Banks8 and commercial  banks8 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAt the  bankerso  request, Hoover &af  ted a letter  on  October S, 
1931, to George Harrison, ,governor  of the New York Renerve Bank, 
explaining.  the  proposal  to  establish the  NCC  (text of  letter 
printed ibid.,  pp.  86-88)  .  Hoover saad  hi-6  purpose was to make a 
request  "for cooperation in unity  of  national  action to assure* 
credit  security . .  ." (ibid.,  p.  86).  which  could  be  fairly 
characterized as a corporatist objective to be .achieved  through 
jawboning  the  private  sector  into  doing  what  the  government 
o:herwise  would feel compelled to do.  On October 6, Hoover met 
with congressional leaders to discuss both his plan for the  NCC and 
his intention to recharter the WFC if  the NCC  did not suffice to 
relieve the increasing illiquidity of the banking system.  Hoover's 
memoirs describe those leaders as "shocked at the revelation that 
our government for the first time in peacetime history might have 
co intervene to support private enterprise," in that case by  re- 
.crea=ing  the WFC as the RFC  (ibid., p.  90) . 
9u:  aoover was hardly alone in advocating corporatist measures 
in response to the European and  especially the British paymcnts 
crises of  1531.  The Amerlcan Legion's annual convention,  which met 
:r.  Dtrra:  on  September  21-13, 931, adopted  resolutions that 
Walzer  2ppmann characterlzea as follows: 
If1  hey  would  like  ro  see  a  strong  central  agency,  like  8 
revlvlfied Council  of  Nazional Defense  [from World War I], 
=ake  the situation ir. hand.  They do not expressly say, but it 
2s lmplxed, that they would like the President and the Council 
=O  assume war powers and somehow to  dictate national action to 
Dvercome the depression.  (Lippmann [1933],  p.  30) 
Lippmann also commented  favorably upon  a  speech on  "industrial 
planningm given September 16, 1931, by Gerard Swope, president of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmGeneral Electric, proposing that the  atitrust laws be amended or 
suspended with respect to the electrical manufacturing industry, 
then  considered  a.  comparatively  new,  cutting-edge,  research- 
oriented,  high-technology  industry,  "relatively  free  of  the 
accumulated bad habits of the older type of industrial  management,  l  . 
in' order  to  permit  that  industry  to  "substitute  cooperative 
planning"  for  the  muncoordinated,  unplanned,  disorderly 
individualismm  in  that  industry  (ibid.,  p. . 37-41)  .  swp8  s 
proposal, of which Hoover certainly would have been aware, through 
Lippmann's newspaper columns if not directly from Swope, called for 
a demonstration project to find out whether restrictions on intra- 
industry competition, inforhation-sharing,,and  federal control of 
prices could be combined to  ensure greater stability of employment 
and wage levels in the electrical industry.  Essentially, it  was 
propased "that  the industry no longer  operate in independent units, 
bu= as a whole, according to rules laid out by a trade association 
of which every unit  employing over fifty men is a member -- the 
-  whole  supervised by  some  Federal  agency  like  the Federal Trade 
.  Comm:ssronn  (Tarbell [1932), p. 228).  Uniform accounting systems, 
ir.f3zna::on  exchanges,  and employee insurance  plans also were to  be 
re~x:red of  each concern in the association (ibid.). 
These are all co,-poratist  ideas.  Lippmann gives this  analysio 
of  them: 
[Olne  cannot  have  industrial  planning  without  a  highly 
cez=ralized con=rol of  production and of prices. . . .  What 
:s  more,  it  is, I  rhink, beyond the wit  of  man to devise 8 
system  of  planned  industry  which  does  not  imply  it. 
Cenrralized control is of the very essence of planning.  For 
how else can  "a planm be  put  into effect?  . . . Planning 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmproved  inadequate,  "the bankers  agrred  to go  along with  that 
understandingm (ibid.). 
Once the NCC was established, with the public support of New 
york Reserve Bank Governor.George  H~arrisox~,~  Meyer again took the 
lead  in  persuading Woover  that  the NCC  mwas not  big enough or 
strong enough to do what  was  neededm  bid  Pusey described 
Meyer's  argument to Hoover as follows: 
1f we  take the assets of the strong banks and freeze them in 
slow loans to  weak banks, . . .  we will make things  worse, not 
better.  The  strong  banks  should  be  kept  strong.  Only 
governmental action can fill the vacuum, . . .  and it ought to 
be  taken soon.  (Ibid. 
Pusey then related the subsequent events: 
Since neither the White House nor the Treasury initiated any 
move  in  that  direction  [rechartering the WFC] , Meyer asked 
Chester Morrill,  secretary of  the  . . . Board,  to review 
pertinent  legislation of the past  and to write a bill for a 
new lending agency with broad powers to stem the tide of the 
depression.  Board  [~eneral]  Counsel Walter Wyatt and Floyd R. 
Harrison  [assistant to Governor Meyer]  also worked  on the 
blll.  [Pursuant  ro  Senate  Democratic  Leader  Joseph  T.  . . 
Robinson's  request, the Democrats] . . . would  support the 
b~ll  if Meyer wro=e ~t  and ran the agency.  Hoover agreed to 
th~s. The  [RFC] bill  was  then  modified  to include  the 
governor of the Federal Reserve Board  as an ex-officio  member 
[and  chairman] of  the RFC board  of  directors.  The-  finished 
draf:  went to Capitol Hill -- not to the White House.  (Ibid.) 
Both Harr~son  and Morrill were appointed to their positions during 
the ac:umn  1931 crisis, Harrison on September 16  and Morrill on 
0c:ober  7  (Federal Rescrvc  Bulletin  (19311, vol.  17, p.. 557). 
wya:t,  who  later drafted  the  narional  bank  conservatorship and  . 
preferred srock purchase provisions of the Emergency Banking Act of 
March  5, 1933  (Jones [1951],  pp.  21-22;  Olson  (19881,  pp.  37-40), 
ha$  loined  the Board's  legal  division .in  1917 and had  been  the 
Board's  general  counsel  since  October  1922.  Because  of  his 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexperience during World War I,  Wyatt  -  war  familiar with the WFCas 
legal structure and operations and became a regular legal adviser 
to the RFC while Meyer wad associated with it. 
Governor Meyer became the Hoover admiaistration's  principal 
advocate of the RFC bill, appearing at Senate  'hearings  as the first 
-  witness on December 18, 1931 (Pusey 119741, p.  217).  Meyer and the 
Board's  staff clearly wanted the RFC to have extensive powers of ' 
the type that  it  later acquired during the New Deal.  As  Pusey 
describes it, 'Senator  Glass told Meyer that he was asking for  more 
power than any man ought to have, but  the latter replied that he 
had no interest in power for its own sake; power was important only 
as it advanced.  the country toward  .recoverym  (ibid., p.  218)  . 
By  :he  time the RPC Act  was enacted on January 22,  1932,'  Hoover 
had  besun  to  lose  his  classical  liberal  inhibitions regarding 
aovernmental interference in private enterprise at an accelerating 
ra:e  bu:,  even according to the historical account most favorable 
=o  Moyer and  the Board's  staff, also had  begun to concentrate on 
prevenzing Me.yer  from dominating the RFC  (ibid., pp.  218-219). 
Dur~ng  the RFC's  formation, Meyer  was a  "human dynamom who  . 
"refused to :ake  no for an answerm  from the persons he was inviting 
23:~  :he  RFC.  HLS wafe. Agnes Meyer, made the following diary 
ezzry durlng this perlod:  '1  know the whole Wash.  crowd consider 
Eugene unbearably dictatorial but  I doubt whether a really great 
intellect  ever  gets  anywhere  with  soft  wirdsa  (Pusey 119741, 
p. 214). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmMeyer seems  to  have consciously  at-tempted  to  duplicate the  WFC 
in its business locations and arecruited WFC people +o staff the 
RFCm  (Olson I19881.  p.  15).  For exa&leo  Meyes  recruited Leo 
Paulger, a banker with the WFC, to staff-  the RFC's  examinations 
division.  Paulger, in turn, "drew up a list of bankers who had 
'assisted  him with the WFC in the 1920s and recruited many of them 
to stafi local wc officesa (ibid.;  Bee also Simonson and ~e-1  .  .  - 
I19931  ) .  The principal ptrso~el  coordinators  for Meyer at the RFC 
were  two of  his  mainstays  at  the Board  --  ~lc&d  Harrison and 
Chester  orr rill  (Pusey (19741,.  p.  219).  Still, Hoover and Meyer 
clashed several times during 1932 on both tactics and strategic. 
direction, with Hoover attempting to politicize the RFC somewhat 
through measures  that  included Whice  House  appointments of  RFC 
Meyer  organized  banking  and  committees  the 
Peaera1  Reserve  distric:~  "to help  the  economy  get  into motion 
agair."  in May-June 1932, with General Eleccric chairman Owen Young 
sgrving as the chairman of  the New York district's  committee (see 
ibid.,  p. 222; Pedrra!  Reserve  Bulletin  119321, vol.  18, pp.  416- 
8.  The Board's  -k  ([19321,  p.  221, describes the 
:x?e=:s  for  the forma:ion  of  these committees (which  on their face 
would seem to be superfluous because their members were drawn from 
7  :he  same pools of  men  who served as Reserve  Bankso directors), 
Acc~riing  co that account, the Board's  concern  (ostensibly  shared 
by :he  Reserve Banks) was =ha=  "steps should be taken to  enlist the 
coopera:lon  of  bankers and  business men  in  an effort  to develop 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmways and means of  making effective+se  of  the funds which were 
being made available by the open-rmrket operatione'  of the System.  a 
The Board  apparently intended that the codttees  would  conduct 
surveys in their districts with-the  purpose of detecting what now 
would be called "credit crunches,a that is,  determining "to what 
extent legitimate credit requirements of commerce, industry, and 
agriculture were not bting supplied on account of a  lack of banking 
facilities or for other reasons, and , , ,  acquainting prospective ' 
borrowers with possible sources of credita (ibid,  1 . 
By  July 1932, Meyeres  health began to fail, and the strain 
associated with enactment of the Emergency Relief and Construction 
ACE of  July 21, 1932 caused him, at the urging of his wife, to  ask 
Hoover :o  have legislation enacted.that  would remove the governor 
of =he Board as ex-officio chairman of the RFC, while enabling him 
:o  rezain his position as governor (Pusey (19741,  p. 225).  Another 
RFZ-related strain that undoubtedly caused some deterioration of 
Meyer's  health was  the collapse of  the Central Republic Barik  of 
Chicagc  in  June 1932:  The  family of  Charles Gates Dawes,  the 
presrden:  of  the  RFC  (and former vice  president  of  the United 
Szazes morr Cool~oge),  owned a contralling stake in the bank, and 
.  -  b---  ,,  ,-,owed  S90  milllon from the RFt to stop a run.' 
Alzhough it is now purely con)ecture  on my  part, it  would not 
be  szrprislng eventually  to find  documentation indicating that, 
amons ozher factors causang Mr. Dawes to turn to the RFC instead of 
=he Feieral Reserve for credit, the personal tensions  between Meyer 
I 
In h~s  capacity as gove--nor of  the ostensibly nonpolitical Board 
17 
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Rese~e  loan nearly impossible.  Support for  this conjecture  my  be 
inferred from the following reference in Pusey:  s- 
Everyone connected with the  -1Dawesl  loan seemed to be kedy 
aware that it would be embarrassing to the ~epublicans.  . . ,. 
Yet Meyer made no apology f or it.  . . .  In fact  the Dawes 
loan had been recommended by two Democratic directors of the 
RFC  [  Jone6 and ~c~arthy]  .  (Ibid.  ,  p.  224) 
 he ~oard  under  eyer actively participated'in  the.enactment 
of  the  Hoover  administration's  emergency  financial  rescue 
legislaation  during 1932, and also supported establishment of the 
NCC and the RFC.  The published sources provide evidence that tus 
legisiation was drafted and promoted mostly by  the Board and its 
staff,  not  the Reserve Banks, although some of  the Reserve Banks 
may have supported it. 
The emergency legislation of 1932 included the first Glass- 
Steagall Act, the Act  of February 27, 1932, Public Law No.  72-44,  . 
which added Sections 10  (a)  and 10  [b)  to  the Federal Reserve Act to 
author~ze  the Board, in unusual and exigent circumstances and when 
approved by at  least .five of  the eight members of the Board, to 
allow rediscounts for groups of member banks and to allow member 
banks =o borrow for up to four months on the security of ineligibl~ 
paper ( ~nzluding  government obligations)  . The first Glass-Steagall 
Acr  aiso amended Section 16 of  the Federal Reserve Act  to allow 
Reserve  Banks  to pledge  aineligiblea government  obligations to 
seczre issues of Federal Reserve notes.  Previously, only gold and 
"real billsm could be used under Section 16.' 
8 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe  administration's  rescue  legislation also  included  the 
Emergency Relief and Construction  Act of July 21, 1932, Public Law 
NO.  72-302,  [Section 210  of  which  added  Section  13  (3)  to the  .......  .  .  .. 
~ederal  Reserve Act] to authorize five of the eight members of the 
Board, in ~~n~~sual  and exigent circumstances,  to  allow  Reserve Banks 
to  discount  neligiblen  paper  (real  bills  and  government 
obligations) for individuals, partnerships. and corporations (see 
Todd  [1993]).  In this case, interestingly, Meyer and the Board 
were willing to allow the Reserve Banks to accept a role of credit 
inremediation  that  involved.  their  dealing  directly  with  the 
general public, while Hoover, only ten days earlier, had vetoed a 
prior version of the bill that provided for the RFC. but not  the 
Reserve  ganks,  to  make  loans  to  individuals.1°  Five  days 
afterward, the Board issued a circular finding that the required 
unusual  and  exigent  circumstances existed  and  authorizing  the 
discaunts for up to  s~x  months  (later  extended  until  1936). 
Xazkiey  (i~9731,  p.  129) notes .that the  "Board lost no time in 
=m~-e-ez::  ng  the  s:a:u=e,"  apparently because  it  was  then  felt 
tna:  bus~ness  concerns and  individuals needed such credit.l2 
-.  ,ne  seeds of  both the second Glass-Steagall  Act  (the  Banking 
A=:  =f  June 16, 1933, PubLlc Law Na.  73-66)  ,I2  and  the Emergency 
Banic~ng  Act  of March 9, 1933  (Public  Law No. 73-1)  ,"  were sown at 
a Marc5 29, 1932 Senate Banking and Currency Cormnittee hearing on 
S. 4115, which Senator Glass had  introduced twelve days earlier. 
Goverzor Meyer  testlfled aurlng the hearing on S.  4115, and the 
Board's  staff  prepared  a  lengthy  memorandum  for his  testimony, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwhich mainly consisted of objectioru U  the bill  (-a1  Rc*rrvg 
in light of later controversie~  is the Board,s statement that 
[TJhere  is already in existence an apm-market committee on 
which each of the Federal reserve banks has representation. 
This has come about as the result of natural development.  The 
board believes that it  would be  inadvisable to disturb this 
development  by  crystallizing  into  law  any  particular 
procedure.  The  board  believes  that  nothing  further  is 
necessary  or  advisable  at  this  time  than  an  amendment 
clarifying  its  power  of  supervision  over  open-market 
operations  of  the  Federal  reserve  banks  and  their 
relationships with foreign banks. . . .  (Ibid., p.  206) 
The Systemn  s Federal Advisory Council also testified in  strong 
opposition  to the  Glass  bill  but  favored  the  creation  of  the 
"liquidaring corporation," the ancestral conception of the FDIC, 
stating: 
[SJuch  a  corporation  as  is  proposed  should  be  financed 
encirely by  Government money, as is intended to be done in 
tne case of  nonmember banks.  .  .  .  In no event does the 
council believe it proper to require member banks to furnish 
the funds needed for such a corporation without at the same 
zime giving the member banks control of such a corporation for 
wkrh  they are to furnlsh the capital from out of their own 
zesxrces.  The council furthermore suggests the possibility 
-  of  havlng the ac=iv::ies  of  [the] . . . corporation taken over. 
by :he  [RFCJ.  (Ibid.,  p. 223) 
Ir. rhe course of =he  hearing. Governor Meyer was asked whether 
i  r  ,, w3~ld  be advisable t3 "unifym  the banking system under federal 
superv:s:an  and  regu1az:on  (presumably at  the  Office  of  the 
Comp=roller of  the Curzency), eliminating the bank chartering and 
s:perxe:scry  roles of the stares. and he offered to  have the Boardor 
szaf  f  prepare  a memorandum  on  =hat topic.  The Board's  general 
cocnsel, Walrer wyazz, submizted that memorandum to the .Board  on 
December  5.  1932.  while  Hoover still was  in office.  The Wyatt 
20 
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supervision, and regulation of banking.  It was publiuhed ia  March 
1933  as  wConsritutionality of  Legislation  Providing a  Uaified 
commercial Banking System for the United Statesa (redera1 Resemg 
pullem  [19331.  vel.  19,  pp.  166-186).  This  memorandum  was 
associated  with  the preparation  of  the  Emergency.  Bank  Holiday 
- 
p roc lama ti on  of  March . 6,  1933  id., pp.  113-1141,  which 
restricted to the Secretary of the Treasury the power to authorize 
the performance  of usual banking functions during the holiday. 
AS Meyer*  s biographer describes it, at  some time before the 
banking  crisis became  acute, probably between December 1932 and 
February  1933,  the  Board  nhad its  counsel  [Wyatt] prepare  an 
executive order declaring a national bank holiday, to be used in 
case  of  necessityn  (Pusey  119741, p.  234) .  Wyatt  derived  the 
s:a=u:o,zy  authority  for  proclaiming  the  president  * s  emergency 
powers from che Trading with the Enemy Act  of World War I (Olson 
[19881,  pp.  3031 Meyer  and  the Board  felt  strongly that the 
--  ,,o=lama:ron  was necessary as the state bank suspensions gathered 
momo,r,:un,  rn  the  weeks  prior  to che  inauguration of  Franklin D. 
Roasovel:  as presrder,:  (March  4,  19331, and they were frustrated 
-  ,.,a:  i  iiaaver  seemed  :.?=lined  only  toward  the  milder  remedy  of 
l:a::rng  wirhdrawals of  currency and gold  (Pusey [1974],  p.  234). 
Hoover became quite angry at  Meyer and the Board during the 
last  two  weeks  of  his  adminisrration  because  the  Board  kept 
pressing upon him  he idea that he should issue the stronger bank 
holiday  proclamation  and  kept  rejecting Hoover's  idea  of  an 80 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpercent federal guarantee of alldcpo~its  to atcm withdrawals and 
restore confidence (Hoover [1952]  , pp.  210-2131 .  Rroey  describes 
the situation as follows:  "By this time Howeros  enmity  toward 
Meyer was painfully evf  dent. . .  -  Once more.  the  Resident and the 
board were operating on different wavelengths* (119741, p.  234). 
Hoover*  s memoirs state, in  connection with this period,  that  he,  -. 
"concluded it  [the Board].  was indeed a weak reed for a nation to 
lean on in time of troublea ( 119521 , p.  212)  . 
Hoover was  willing to entertain the notion of an emergency 
proclamation  limiting  withdrawals,  but only if Roosevelt authorized 
him to say that the president-elect also approved of it.  A request 
to that effect was transmitted to Roosevelt on February 18,  1933 
(ibid.,  p.  215).  Roosevelt was unwilling to authorize such an 
action  before  he  was  politically  accountable  for  it  (no 
*'responsibility  without powera)  and also was annoyed with Hewer's 
demand thac Roosevelt renounce "90k of the so-called New Dealm  as 
H~ovcr's  price  f'or bearing the onus of  issuing the proclamation 
(Schles~n~er  [19591,  p. 4).  The Trading with the Enemy Act, which 
s:ill  :s  =he pu:ative  s=atu:ory  basis of numerous emergency powers 
of  the  federal  governmen:,  was  a  suspect  foundation  for  the 
emeryezcy edifice.  As Hoover wrote: 
f  had consulted our legal advisors as to the use of a certain 
unrepealed  war  power  over  bank  withdrawals  and  foreign  . 
exchange.  Most  of  them were in doubt on the ground that the 
lack of  repeal was probably an oversight by the Congress, and 
un5er  another  law,  all  the  war  powers  were  apparently 
terr.;na=ed  by  the peace.  Secretary  [of the Treasury Ogdenl 
klls  and Senator Glass held that no certain power existed. 
There  was danger that  action under such doubtful authority 
would  create a mass  of  legal conflicts in the country and 
would  xncur  the  refusal of the  banks  to comply.  I  then 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmdeveloped the idea of my  insuing an executive order  under this 
power, provided Roosevelt would- approve.  My legal advisors 
agreed that, if he approved, it could be done becrume  he could 
secure  ratification  in  r  few  days  from  his  overvhelming 
majority in the incoming Congress.  (Hoover [1952], p.  205) 
Another telling indictment of the legal, as distinct from the 
political, basis for the emergency proclamation that the Boardn  s 
general  counsel  prepared  was  the  following  exchange  between 
Roosevelt.and  Senator Glass in Roosevelt~s  hotel room at  ll:30 on 
the night before the inauguration: 
[Roosevelt]  :  [Hoover  says that the Board has asked hjm twice 
within the last three days to  issue an emergency  proclamation, 
but  I told him that the governors of the states can take care 
of bank closings.  ] 
[Glass]  :  "Yes, I know.  " 
[Roosevelt]  :  "The previous time [that the Board asked Hoover 
for the  proclamation]. I  sent  [incoming Treasury Secretary 
William] Woodin to  [outgoing  Treasury Secretary Ogdenl Mills 
to  tell  him  I  would  not  give  my  approval  to  such  r 
proclamation.'  , 
wI  see.  What  are you planning to do?" asked Glass. 
"Planning to close them, of  course," answered Roosevelt. 
l'You  will have no authority to do that, no authority to issue 
any  such  proclamation,"  protested  Glass.  "It  is.  highly  . 
questionable in my mind if you will even have the authority to 
close national banks -- and there is no question, at all, that 
you, even as President, will lack the authority to close banks 
chartered by the s:ates." 
"i  will  have that aurhoriry," argued Roosevelt.  "Under the 
Enemy  Trading  Act, passed  during  the World  War  and  never 
rescznded  by  Congress,  I,  as  President,  will  have  the 
authority to issue such an  emergency proclamation  'for  the 
pcrpose,  *  as the A=:  says, 'of  limiting the use of coin and 
currency to necessary purposes.'" 
n ,,  +-  2s  my  unders=and:ng  =hat President Hoover explored that 
avenue a  year or  two ago -- and  again during recent.  days," 
sald  Glass.  "Likewise, 1:  is  my  understanding  that  the 
Aztorney General ~nfomed  him that it was highly questionable 
:f,  even under thls ac:,  though it has never been rescinded  by 
Congress,  the  President  has  any  such  authority.  Highly 
questionable because the likelihood is the act was dead with 
=he  signlng of  the Peace TreaEy, if  not before.' 
"My advice is precisely the opposite.' 
"Then  you've  go:  some  expedient  advice,"  returned 
Glass. . . .  [Glass  then argued that the courts would find 
the proclamation unconstitutional  because it would require the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmunwarranted closing of solvent banks and because, even if all 
the banks were  known to be  insivent,]  "1 am  sure such a 
proclamation could not legally include banks  chartered by the 
states.  a  [Wyatt s written opinion  of December 5, 1932, argued 
just  the contrary, that the  federal governmat could close 
state-chartered banks.]  >-,. 
~Ne~ertheless,~  declared Roosevelt, "1  am going to issue such 
a pro~lamation.~  ... 
convinced though he  [~lassl  was there had been no need for 
closing the banks  [Glass  believed that only insolvent banks 
could  not  withstand  the  of  February-March 1933)  and 
certain,  too,  the  president  was  withwt  constitutional 
authority  for his act,  those coavictiorm were lost causes. 
(Smith  and Beasley  (19721, pp.  341-343) 
Hoover writes in his memoirs that if Roosevelt really  believed 
what  he  told Senator Glass late on March 3,  then he should have 
joined Hoover in issuing a proclamation limiting withdrawals and 
issuing the 80 percent guarantee of deposits to avoid closinq the 
banks:  "But closing the banks would be a Bign the country was in 
the ditch.  It  was the American equivalent of the burning of the 
Reichstag  to  create  'an  emergency'"  (Hoover  (19521, p.  214). 
However, as noted in the earlier discussion of the measures taken 
f =om the fall  of 1931 onward,  it was Governor Meyer and the Board's 
szaff who  led  =he way  in  finding  reasons  for  proclaiming 
emergencies and  for pushing forward  -the  boldest  emergency relief 
schemes, against the recalcitrance of  Hoover, who went along with 
m..  ,,,.  -h  :ha:  he  should no:  have but  retamed to the end the capacity 
to discern excess where the Board apparently did not. 
111.  Wart  tho  Roomcvelt  rdminimtrrtion  (aad tho  Imdaral 
Remewe Board) did to alter Boover'  mchumsm, marly 1933-lrtm  1933. 
As  is  generally known,  one  of  President  Roosevelt86 first 
official  acts after taking office on Inauguration Day  (Saturday, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmMarch 4, 19331,  was to  proclaim an emergency, three-day,  nationwide 
banking holiday, signed and effective Monday, March 6,  Late in the 
preinaugural banking crisis, on March  3, the-  Federal  Reserve Board 
and the New York Reserve-Bank's.  Governor.-Rarrison  had agreed that' 
the ~oard  would  issue an  order closing all the Federal Reserve 
Banks.  New York Governor  Herbert Lehman, at the  urging of Governor 
Harrison, also agreed to  proclaim an emergency bank holiday in New 
York, and a similar action was taken in  Illinois.  Thus, the Board 
had placed first Hoover and then Roosevelt in a position in which, 
as  a practical  matter,  the president  could not  allow Monday  to 
arrive without some kind of emergency proclamation (Pusey (19741; 
These extraordinary actions tended  to intensify the crisis 
armasphere.  As Schlesinger writes: 
Wherher revolution was a real possibility or not, faith in a 
free  system was  plainly  waning.  Capitalism,  it  seemed to' 
many,  had  spent  its  force;  democracy  could  not  rise  to 
ez~nomic  crisis.  The only hope lay in governmental leadership 
.of a power and will which representative institutions seemed 
:zp:en=  to produce.  Some looked enviously on Moscow, others 
on Berlin and Rome. . . .  (Schlesinger (19591,  p.  3) 
Sena:=rs  Cu:ting  (New Mexico),  La  Follette  (Wisconsin), and 
Cas:~gan  (Colorado)  urged  Roosevelt  to  nationalize  the 
a==:.rr.ss=ra:ion,  if  no:  :he  ownersh~p,  of  the banking system, but 
=he  president  decided  not  to  do  so  because  of  assurances  of 
bankerso  cooperation with his New Deal reform plans (ibid., p.  5). 
He 1:mi:ed  his initiative in thxs respect to federal control of the 
li=ens=ng  procedure  for  reopening  banks  after  the  holiday. 
~i~resentative  Hamilton Fish of New York, after Roosevelt  @s  first 
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meligiblem  collateral under Section 13 of the Federal Reservt ~ct 
and, after inspection  of collateral and  thorough examinationm  of 
the applicant, to  any nonmember  bank on ineligible collateral under 
the then-current version of Section 10  (b)  of the Act, which still 
required a finding of atanusual aird  exigent circumstancesm  by  at  ,  ' 
least  five  governors of  the Board  (Board of  Governors, ma' 
Re~ort  (19331  , p.  266)  .  The Treasury issued numerous regulations, 
licensing orders, and statements  regarding the  banks throughout the 
month  of March,  and  most,  if  not  all,  of  them were  drafted  or 
cleared  for issuance by  the Board's  staff  (see Federal Reserve 
Bulletin [1933), vol .  19, pp. 122-1331  . As evidence that the Board 
was  slightly  more  enthusiastic  than  the  Reserve  Banks  for 
compliance with the new order of  things in Washington, the March 
(ibid.,  reports that  March  the 
Board asked the Reserve Banks to prepare and forward a list of all 
persons  wno  had  withdrawn  gold  or  gold  certificates  from  the  .  . 
.Reserve  Banks or from member banks since February 1, 1933, .and  who 
ha5  no= redeposited. 1:  ln  a bank  on or  before March  13, 1933,.  ' 
;are=  ex:enoed  to  March  27.  "The board  also advised them  [the 
-  .-.eser\*t  Ban~s]  :ha=  1:  had  no  ob]ec:ion  to  obtaining  similar 
~zi=rsa:zon  from  nanmember  banks  and  infomation  regarding 
W.  ,,..  - 6;-  ,,  awals prior to Fekrzary 1"  (ibid.  1 . 
Nka:  :he  Board an=  :he  Roosevelt administration intended to  do 
W.  C i  ,  ,..  zze  znf  o,ma::on  abou:  gold withdrawals soon became evident. 
Or:  April  5,  1933, Presiden:  Roosevelt  issued an executive order 
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standard for.  private international transactions. .On April 29, the 
Treasury issued regulations governing domestic purchases of gold 
for industrial, professional, and artistic  uses and the exportation 
of  gold-  (ibid., pp.  266.269). 
pressed by political demands "for inflat-ion,  " lqely  from "a 
few crackpot congressmenand senators . . .,.a few  businessmen and 
farm leaders organized  under  the  title  'The  Committee  for the 
Nation,'  and a couple of starry-eyed monetary experts," Roosevelt 
acceded to the demands of the inflationists on  April 18 and 19 and 
decided  to block  private exports of  gold before  announcing his 
public acceptance of  the inflationary provisions of Title I11 of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12. 1933 (amended  on ky  27, 
1933  1 , sponsored  by Senator Elmer Thomas  of Oklahoma (Moley  (19391  , 
pp. 156-161;  Federal Reserve Bulletin (19331,  vol. 19, pp. 307-318, 
333-3381  .  Because  the  Thomas  Amendment  (Title  111)  passed 
overwhelmingly on April 28 Ln both houses of Congress, 64  -21  in the 
Stnate and 307-86 in the House of  Representatives, it  is unclear 
=ha:  resrstance  by  =he  Board  could  have  been  effective  in 
prevecrlng  enactment of  :he  amendment.  However, Raymond Moley88 
narra:ive  (:he  best punlrshed account of the Thomas  Amendment) docs 
no:  ind~cate  that anyone from the Federal Reserve was present at 
:he  White House during the crucial debates on April 18 and 19 that 
persuaaed Roosevelt to endorse the amendment. 
Meyez*  s biograpny tenas to confirm this version of  events: 
Pfzer the banks began to reopen in mid-March, Meyer no longer went 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmto the White House, asked permission -  to resign u  goveraor of the 
Board  on  March  24,  and  finally  left  the Board oa May 10 
(pusey  [1974]  ,  pp.  238i241; Pcdcral  Reserm  Bullet  119331, 
- 
vol . 19, p.  273 .  ~oley  later opined that Roosevelt , believing 
congressLonally mandated monetary inflation to be inevitable, had  , 
concluded that  ,he  should endorse the Thomas Amendment in order rnto  . .  - 
circumvent uncontrolled  inflation  by C~ngreas,~  but Budget Director  . 
Lewis  Douglas  declared,  aWellr this  is the  end  of  western 
civilizationa (Moley (19391,  pp.  160-161).  At  about this time at 
the Board,'~loyd  Harrison resigned as assistant to the governor on 
May 15; J.F.T.  08Connor  was appointed comptroller of the currency 
on May 11 and became an ex-officio  member of the Board;and Eugene 
R.  Black.  governor of  the federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta since 
1928, was appointed governor of the Board, replacing Meyer on May 
17, 1'933 (9~  119331, vol.  19, p.  273). 
The Thomas Amendment  authorized the president to direct the 
secreta-y  of the treasury to  negotiate with the Boa.rd  to  pedt  the 
Reserve Banks to conduct open-market operations in U.S.  government 
obli5a:ions  and to  purchase up to 53 billion of securities.  directly 
C  -=om =he Treasury  (all such transactions until then having been 
res=rl==ed by  sta:ute  to  the  open  market)  during  economic 
emersen=ies  or  to  stabilize  the  dollar  domestically  or 
intema=ionally.  If  the  Reserve  Banks  refused  to  make  the  - 
purchases  requested,  or  if  their  open-market  operationa-  were 
inadequaze, the president could authorize the Treasury to issue up 
r.08S3 billion of inconvertible, legal-tender,  agreenbacka  currency 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmnotes, to be retired over a 25-year:  .- schedule.  The president was 
also authorized to issue a proclamation fixing the gold weight of 
the dollar at  a ratio as much  as 50 percent below the prrt-1933 
standard of $20.67 per ounce of  gold, in  grains 90 percent f  he. 
There  was  a silver purchase  section  (up to $200  million) and, 
finally, an amendment of Section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act  to 
authorize the Board, by a vote of at least five members and with 
the  president '  s  approval,  to  increase  or  decrease  reserve 
requirements if *an  emergency exists by reason of credit ucpansion 
. . . .  (federal Reserve B-  t19331, vol.  19, pp.  317-3181 
On May 27, the Thomas  Amendment was further amended to  provide that 
all coins and currencies of  the United States, including Federal 
Reserve notes, were legal tender; previously, those notes had only 
lllawful  moneyw status, but  they were convertible into gold before 
March  1933  (ibid., pp.  336-3381.''  Congress  passed  a  Joint 
Resolu:ion,  H.J.Res. 192, Public Resolution No.  73-10,  on June 5, 
1933. affirming this interpretation of the Thomas  Amendment (ibid., 
p. 3381. 
The  Board  was by  no means  idle during the Thomas Amendment 
atbaze, however, in shaping the legislative agenda after the March 
ernergrsry  was pas:.  The Glass-Steagall Act,  the Banking Act  of 
Jxe  16, 1933, was mak:ng  1:s  way through Congress from mid-March 
onward.  One  notable  insertion, made  in  the  bill  despite  the 
i-4  a -  objections  of  Senator  Glass,  the  Amcrican  Bankers 
Asso=;a=lon, and  the Assoclatlon of  Reserve City Bankers  (whose 
views reasonably may be  taken to approximate those of the Reserve 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmBanks although  the Board did not adopt  -  8n  offidal  position), was 
the establishment'  of federal deposit insurance uader Section 8 of 
the bill  (Flood [1992], p.  52;  Fedume  Bullctfn  [19333, 
VO~.  19,  pp.  385-401,  especially  pp.  387-394).  Originally 
conceived of as purely a liquidating corporation for closed banks, 
the Board proposed in its March 29, 1932  -comments  on the'  Glass  bill 
that  the prototype of  the ~ederal  Deposit  Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC)  be limited to  member banks.  The FDIC prototype also was to  . 
be funded  by $100 million of capital contributed from the  Treasury 
(characterized  as the recapture of a franchise tax  previously paid 
in from the earnings of Reserve Banks) and by debentures issued in 
amounts up to twice its subscribed capital,  .with  the Reserve Banks 
being  authorized to purchase  the debentures up to one-fourth of 
their cumulative surplus (Federal  Reserve Bulleta [l932],  vol. 18, 
pp  -23  -  The Board  (principally  Wyatt) offered a substitute 
for =he relevant section of  the bill that was quite close to the 
final version  of  the FDIC provisions of  the Glass-Steagall Act. 
The Boar5 =hen added, in March 1932, "This  is not a propitious time 
to  ask  =he  member  banks  to  contribute  to  the  liquidating 
corpsrazzon !FDIC protorypel.  The banks are going through 8  very 
dlff1csl.r  period  and  to  tax  them  for  this purpose  would  be  8 
co~s:ierable  hardship on themn (ibid., p.  211). 
The Federal Advisory Council,  probably reflecting the Reserve 
Banks' vlews at  the March 29, 1932 Senate hearing, testified that, 
while  rhe  Council  favored  the  creation  of  the  liquidating 
corporazlon, "it should be  financed entirely by Government money, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmas is intended to be done in the ca*  of aorrmcmbcr banks  [through 
the RFC]  a  (ibid.,  p.  223)  .  The first draft  of  the Glaus bill, 
introduced in'the  Senate on January 22, 1932, would have provided 
on this point as follows: 
A  Federal  liquidating  corporation  was  to be  formed,  the , 
capital of which would be supplied by an appropriation from ; 
the Treasury and from  assessments  against member banks as  well  . 
as Federal Reserve.  Banks8 surpluses.  This capital was .to  be 
used  in purchasing the assets of closed member banks,  thus 
speeding  up  payments  to depositors.  (Smith and  Beasley 
[19721,  pp.  305-3061 
Thus, the issue to be  resolved, narrowly framed, was whether the 
Reserve Banks8  cumulative surplus  should  be used to  provide part  .of 
the initial capitalization of the FDIC  faad  whether that surplus 
belonged to the member banks or to the Treasury). 
In :he  final  Banking Act of 1933, the Board's  vision was close 
=o  =he  FDIC  provisions  that  were  enacted.  The  Treasury  was 
requ~red  to provide 5150 million of capital  (actually  provided by 
:he  XFC), and the Reserve Banks were required to subscribe for the 
c*--,  .  s capital.stock  "to an amount equal to one-half of the surplus 
of  such bankis1  on January 1, 1933."  The Reserve Banks then held 
5278.6 million of total surplus (Federal Reserve Bulleth (19331, 
vol  .  15, p. 388;  Board of Governors,  -a1  Renort (19331  ,  p.  103)  . 
The aeserve  Banks, perhaps urged  by  their directors and member 
ban~s,  apparently  regarded  this  stock  subscription  as  8x3 
expro7riation of their funds  [an involuntary exchange for unjust 
campensat  ion  that  had  doubtful  real  value]  .  The  FDIC  stock 
subscr1p:ion  was  effected  In January  1934, when  the  cumulative 
surplus was reduced from 5277.7 million to 5138.4 million (one-half 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmof  the January 1933 surplus was  taks).  (Board of Governors, 
Annual Re~ort  (19341,  p.  91).  Of the ~UbScription,  $69.7  million 
was paid in January 1934 and $69.7  million was noted .called  for 
payment on April 15 . {Federal Reserve B-  (19341  ,  vol.  20, p. 
gq ) .  -  However, the Reserve Banks, apparently acting on their own  , 
initiative,  .created  an  accounting  =try  entitled aResen?es  {Federal. 
Deposit  Insurance ~orporat  ion stock.  self-insurance, ere.  )  and 
used it to charcre  off entirelv the S139.3'million  value of the FDIC 
stock previously carried on their  books in July 1934, at the close 
of the same calendar quarter in which the stock subscription was 
completed  (ibid.,  p.  516)  .  This event passed without  recorded 
comment by the Board in either the Federal Reserve Bu  or the 
Board's Annual Report. 
Simultaneously  with the  passage of the  Glass-Steagall  Act, the 
National  Industrial Recovery Act  (NIRA), also  enacted June 16, 
1933, was  making  its way  through Congress but  was not  commented 
upon In ei=her of the Board's  two official publications for 1933. 
In ligh:  of subsequent even=s, it appears probable that the spirit 
of ~nduszrial  planning was reinforced at the Board after  June 1933. 
far  =no  zhing, the  NIRA,  whose  creation was  favored by  m  odd 
caa11z:on  of  Theodore  Roosevelt-Progressive Republicans,  labor 
iearitrs. and "Brain Tmstersm (presidential  assistants) Rexford G. 
Tuowell and Raymond Moley, was modeled on the activities of the old 
War  2niuszzies Board  of  World  War  I and, accordingly, must  have 
been a::ractive  to  General Counsel Wyatt, the  highest-ranking  World 
War  I  holdover on the Board's  staff.  Schlesinger describes how 
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on  business-government  cooperation plans  ia  April  1933,  begged 
General Hugh Johnson, who had been deputy to  Bernard Baruch on the  - 
War Industries  Board, 'to  get into the picture:  .'Nobody  can do it 
better than you.  You8re  familiar with the only comparable thing 
.that's ever been done -- the work of  the War Industries Boardwm 
(Schlesinger (19591  ,  pp.  96-97)  . 
Matthew  Josephson describes the principal  features of  the 
early  National  Recovery  Administration  --  whose  emblem  became 
Johnson's  famous NRA "Blue Eaglem -- as follows: 
The NRA  introduced national planning under trade agreements 
called  mcodes,m  which  were  drafted  by  the different  trade 
associatians and  administered mainly by  representatives of 
business.  The whole  scheme for control of  production, for 
stabilizing wages, and for eliminating "unfair" competition, 
wnile  granting  immunity  from  antitrust  prosecution,  ' was 
conceived originally by President Gerard Swope of the General 
Eleczric and by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; it was modified 
somewhat by granting labor a vague "bill of rights," the NRA 
7  (a)  clause providing for workers' representation  by unions  of 
=heir own  choosing.  . . .  Johnson declared  at  the start, ' 
"This  is  not  an  experiment  in  dictatorship,  it  is  an 
expefiment in coopera~ion.~  . . .  [TJhe  NRA . . . encouraged 
car:el  organization in the various industries. . . .  Several 
of the largest employers, such as Henry Ford, consulted their 
lawyers  and  flatly  refused  to  comply  with  such programs; 
Sewell Avery.  head  of  the great Montgomery Ward mail order 
zazcern, . .  .  res1s:ed  the NRA. . . .  In Washington there 
was  a  free-for-all as  representatives  of  large  and  small 
::~s:nesses  congrega=ed ir. the capital to have their quotas of 
ou:pu=,  prxces,  and  wages  established  to  their  liking. 
;Josephson (19721. pp. 240-2501 
?he  history  of  the  NRA  after  June  1933  is  described  ia 
S=.L.lesrnger  ((19591.  pp.  87-176).  Johnson, Tugwell, and  other 
s:aluarz  defenders of :he  IRA believed that the business production 
cades, combined  with  =he organization of  labor  into collective 
bargaining  units, would  create a public sense of solidarity, of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmeveryone joining  forces in a common enCsrpraae, a uomewhat rormnzic 
notion that-  derived directly from the aspirations of the Catholic 
Socialism and Christian (that is, Protestant) Socialism mavemcnts 
of  late-nineteenth-century  Europe  (see  Gide arrd  Rist  [1913], 
pp.  483  -  514 .  A  "Blue Eaglea parade in support of the NRA drew. 
large  crowds  in  New  York  City  in  early  September  1933,  and 
industries submitted draft production codes to  the  NRA in the late 
summer and  early  fall.  Some industries tried to hold out  for 
company  unions  instead  of  the  independent  unions  required  by 
Section 7  [a)  of the,  National Industrial ~ecove* Act  (Schlesinger 
[I9591 , pp.  115-117, 136-1511  . 
In the fall.of  1933, however, the problem of enforcing price 
agreements  began to  undermine the  NRA8s  codes.  Some industries  had 
companies  to  'break  their  cartel price limits, 
and other industries enforced cartel limits but  competed (outside 
the  NRA  codes) against  other  industries with  respect  to price 
(ibid., pp.  119-1211.  To  most  of  the public,  it  seemed  that 
.  control of prices and production had been ceded to  big 'businesses, 
which  were  allowed  to  collude  in  fixing prices  and  production 
legally  in  cartels authorized  by  the NRA.  However, businesses 
c~rnplaincd  that  the  NRA  inzerfered  too  much  in  their  pricing 
aecislons.  Yielding to businesses' complaints, the NRA tolerated 
higher ::xed  prices than it o:he,-wise  might have done; this effort 
to zncrease profits ravaged by the depression created a situation 
in  which  "business could  keep  production  down  and  prices  upa 
(ibid., pp.  122-1261. 
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and  speeches  by  Senator  Gerald  Nye  of  North  Dakota  began  to 
undermine the perceived moral authority  of the NRA  between the fall 
.? 
of 1933 and the early months of 1934.  Johnson, succumbing to the 
scrain  of  events,  became  prone  to  emotional  swings  and  more 
attracted  to  the  systematic  organization  of  society  along 
corporatist lines.  As Schlesinger  writes: 
In the end, he [Johnson]  saw an agency which would absorb the 
Departments  of  Commerce  md  Labor  aad  arr,u.nd  which  the 
American government and economy could eventually be  rebuilt. 
This conception of NRA had ambiguous potentialities.  Johnson 
once presented Frances Perkins [the  first secretary  of labor] 
with a copy of Rafael10 Viglione's  Thews;  and, 
when he finally resigned [in  September 19341, he invoked what 
he  called  the  "shining name"  of  Mussolini  ia  a  farewell 
speech.  He was, of course, no Fascist.  (Schlesinger  (19591, 
p. 153) 
. -. . 
Bur  Johnson, like many other business-oriented Washingtonians of 
that era, did admire greatly what Mussolini appeared to have done 
(much  of  which was a mere facade) to rebuild the Italian economy. 
af=tr  .World  War  I; such feelings were comprehensible in the era 
before :he  Ethiopian War of  late 1935-early 1936  (see Josephson 
119721,  p. 250; Ferguson  (19841,  pp.  45, 85-89).  The appeal of 
-  ras=:sc  prior to and during the NRA era is summarized well in this 
passage by  Eugen Weber: 
To :hose  for whom optxmxsm, humanism and universalism did not 
wash.  who  regarded  economics  as  secondary  to politics  md 
found material forces less appealing than moral ones, Fascism 
had  to be the ideology of choice.  In catastrophic times, it 
~roposed  a  heroic  society led  by  self-selected elites, m 
egalitarianism of  the merrtocratic, a revolutionary idialism 
to replace historxcal materialism and a militant, modernizing 
revolution that challenged the delusive dreams generated by 
the rival revolution in Russia.  To his admirers in the 1920s 
'  (Freud  and Churchill among them), Mussolini . . . offered not 
an  alternative to revolution but  an alternative revolution 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmjust as violent, as nonconformist,.   as^ a~aat=~.rde  as that of 
the left .  (Weber [19941)  - 
In February 1935, Roosevelt requested a two-year renewal of 
the NRA,  whose  authority  was  to expire  in June.  Most  of  the 
public, according to Schlesinger, was lukewarm about renewal, but  . 
the  trade  associations  and  ~iorrp  were  loyal  to the  concept 
(schlesinger [19591, p.  1661,  ithich  probably  should  call  into 
question the capacity of  today's  trade associations and uaions to 
evaluate the workings of a market economy fairly.  Before,renewal 
of the NRA could occur, the Supreme Court decided &.L.A.  Schechta 
Poultrv Cornoration v. United States, 295 U.S.  495 (May  27, 1935), 
which  held  unconstitutional  the  delsgation  of  congressional 
authority to regulate interstate commerce by  the making of  codes 
. -. 
that were essentially determined by trade  and industry associatioas 
together with the executive branch.  That was the end of the main 
pas:  of  the  NRA  experiment,  but  the  political  realignment  of. 
dif  f erenz  industries for and  against the New Deal, based on the 
proporzion of protection and subsidy that each industry  believed it 
could  expect,  continued  through the  1936  presidential  election 
(Ferguson [1984)  , especially pp.  85-92; Ferguson (19911  1 . 
Schlesinger observes, even after the  decision, 
[The] theorists  of  the  managed  society  also  continued  to 
consider an NRA as indispensable. . . .  "Industrial laissez- 
faire is unthinkable,"  [said Raymond Moley, who argued that  - 
slomething had to be  done "to satisfy the need for government 
intervention  and  industrial  cooperationa;  .the  interests 
involved in our economic life are too  great to  be abandoned to  . 
:he  unpredictable  outcome  of  unregulated  ~ompetition.~ 
(Quoted in Schlesinger [19591,  pp.  166-1671 
National planning advocates faced mounting crit  &ism  from Brandeis- 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmliberal antitrust and progrowth advocates;  -  but  the following key 
insight  from  Schlesinger's  accouat  points  the  way  toward  the 
arrival of Matriner Eccles and Lauchlin Currie at the Board in the 
.L 
fall of 1934:  "Then too a rising group.  within the administration 
was arguing that the key to  recovery lay not in the reorganization 
-  of economic structure but  in fiscal policy  and  the-  increase in 
government spendingm (ibid.  , p.  167)  . 
After June 1933, besides concerns arising from implementation 
of the NRA8s  program, the Board was busy coping with the aftermatth 
of the failure of the International Monetary Conference in  London 
in July (see  Moley t19391 , pp.  196-2691  , the aftermath  of the  March 
banking crisis, the  administration's experiment  raising the 
dollar price of  gold that was announced publicly in October 1933 
(see  Jones  (19511, pp.  245-2541, and the commencement of federal 
deposit  insurance  on  January  1,  1934.  But  there  was  no  new 
ic~rs1a:ion  of overriaing importance to the  Board  or its staff 
d:r:ng  =his period after June 1933. 
IV.  The Pirmt New Deal trkem  on r corporrtimt c01orati~~  . 
with active Federal Remerve Board rmaiataace, late 1933-late  1934. 
The accounts of  :he  NRA that are summarized in Part I11 &e 
=npr:ant  for establ~shiag  the background against which the events 
described in Part IV should be considered.  From late 1933 through 
lace  1934,  men  with~n  the  Federal  Reserve  System  or  closely 
ass3r:a:ed  with  it  (like Senator Glass), who should have  known 
betzer but  believed that they were doing the right thing, openly 
advocated that the Federal Reserve begin to take measures that we 
39 
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then floating around Washington.  Even  Eccles and Curria, who rose 
with the faction in the Roosevelt  administration that advocated 
increased government spending  and an activist  fiscal  policy instead 
of  central  planning,  later  succumbed  to  some  of  the  central 
planners'  ideas,.  creating an interesting hybrid political economy 
model for the Board in the  second half of the 1930s.  This hybrid. 
could  be  described  as  a  mixture  of  ideas  drawn  from  orthodox 
~eynesianism  and  ideas  from  the  Chicago  Plan  for  100  percent 
reserves banking. 
president Roosevelt  , under the influence of economists to  whom 
he  was introduced by  Henry  -Morgenthau,  Jr.,  who then was head of 
the Farm  Credit Administration, began to consider experiments in 
raising =he dollar price of gold as a means of raising the price of 
all commodities during the summer of 1933.  Morgenthau had studied 
under one of those economists, George Warren of Cornell University; 
-  -5% czherr were'  Irving Fisher  (Yale)  and Frank Pearson (~o.mell). 
.  . 
Olsoc writes:. 
In  mid-August 1933, Roosevelt  told Morgenthau he  wanted to 
devalue the dollar with gold purchases.  The decision ignited 
a 5::ter  debate and aemons=rated the president's  independence 
cf conse-rvative ideologies.  Under Secretary of the Treasury 
Dean  Acheson  frnnly  opposed  him.  .  .  .  When  [Secretary] 
Wtlliam Woodin became  ill in 1933, Treasury duties fell to 
Acheson,  although  the  president  frequently  consulted vith 
Morgenthau about Treasury business. . . . Acheson thought the  . 
commodity  dollar  [theory] was  ludicrous.  .  . .  Tired of 
Acheson's  obstructionism,  Roosevelt fired him in  November.  By 
=ha= time Roosevelt had named Morgenthau -acting  secretary of  .. 
=he treasury.  "  (Olson [19BB],  p.  107) 
The  role in the gold-buying episode, like 
was opposition. 
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Board.  .  .  .  [The new  governor,  Eugene  Black,  was]  a 
conservative  banker  and  attoraey  serving .am  head  of  the 
Federal Reservc Bank of Atlanta.  Throughout the late 19206 
and early 1930s  Black  had predicted a national banking =isis, 
and he gained widespread recognition when those apparitions 
came true.  Black had close ties with the American Bankerso 
Association  and other financial  trade  groups, and he looked on 
the gold buying scheme as pure foolishness.  Black was not-as, 
adamant  about  it  as  [Warvard professor  and  Morgenthau's 
executi~e  assistant  Oliver  M.1  Sprague,  [Budget  Director 
~ewisl  Douglas, and Acheson, and his independence  at 'the  Fedw 
insulated  him  from  Roosevelt8s wrath,  but  he  nevertheless 
strongly opposed the prograrp.  George Harrison of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, along with the entire Wall Street 
investment community, thought gold buying would destroy the 
money markets.  (Ibid.  1 
Because the Federal Reserve would not take the lead in buying 
gold  to  support  the  commodity  dollar  theory,  Roosevelt  and 
Morgenthau turned to Jesse Jones and the RFC to do so.  Jones was 
shrewd enough to know that, if  he opposed gold buying, he would  - 
lost  influence  with  Roosevelt,  just  as  Acheson,  Douglas,  and 
Sprague had  done.  The  RFC  issued  $150 million  of  short-term 
obligazions  (which  the Reserve Banks were  forbidden by  law from 
to finance its gold purchases 
An6  :here  was  one  part  of  gold  buying  that  Jones  loved. 
L7y:hing  :hat  raased so much ire on Wall Street couldn't  be 
all  bad.  .  .  .  Late  in October 1933, Jesse Jones, George 
Kaw-0  --,n,  and  Henry  Morgen:hau  met  each  morning  at  the 
presiaen:'~  bed  to set  a gold  price.  The daily price was 
rrrelevan:  as long as :he  :rend  was up..  To keep speculators 
cff  balance they f1uc:uated  the daily price, but  the general 
:rend  was up, from  S29.01 an ounce on October 23,  1933, to 
534.06 on January 17, 1934. . . .  Much to George Harrison's 
chagrin, Jones used  the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
purchase gold abroad on behalf of  the RFC.  Harrison hated it 
and Jones loved to watch him squirm.  At  the morning meeting., 
arnldst laughter and coin flips and silly compromises, the fou 
men reached a daily prlte.  Jones and Morgenthau occasionally 
wrnced at  how unscienzific their methods were, but  they did 
rarse the price  of  gold and  reduce the gold content of  the 
I  dollar.  Eventually the RFC bought a total of more than four 
mrlllon ounces of gold for S134 million.  (Ibid., pp. 109-110) 
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Treasury and acting secretary on November 17, 1933, when Woodin 
became ill.  On December 13, Woodin resigned, and  ~otgenthau  became 
-. 
secretary and ex-officio chairman of the Federal Reserve Board on 
January I, 1934 (frderal  Re~r-e  B-  [19341,  ~01-  20, p. 63.  , 
On December 28,  1933, as the gold-buying program was winding don,..  . 
~orgenthau  issued an order requiting the delivery of all privately.  - 
held  gold  (with minor  uceptioi) to Raseme Bmk. and member 
banks,. to  be  held  for  the  account  of  the Treasury (ibid., . 
pp.  9-10).  On  January  16,  1934,  the Roosevelt  administration 
introduced  the bill  that  would  become  the Gold  Reserve Act  of 
January 30, 1934; the administration terminated the gold buying 
program on January 17 (ibid.  , p.  73  1 . 
The Treasury's  gold  delivery order  caused  a  great  deal  of 
consternation among the Reserve Banks because they believed that 
they had a fiduciary duty toward gold deposited with them by their* 
member banks  and that, in  the absence of  a statute  -specifically. 
direczing  them to turn over member banks'  gold to the Treasury, 
they  could  not  in  goo5  conscience  do  so.  Governor Black  was  . 
infanned of  the Resetve Banks'  position on this question during a 
governors'  conference  (apparently following the issuance of  the 
Treasury's  order) and  presented  their  reservations to Congress 
during testimony on the Senate  version of the  Gold Reserve Act bill 
on  Janua--y  17,  1934  (ibid., pp.  73-76).  The  outcomeowas  a 
compromise  under  which  Section  2  (a)  of  the  Gold  Reserve  Act 
explicitly vested the Reserve Banks'  t'itle to gold in the United 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmStates  (that  i6,  the  Reserve  Bank8'  title  to  the  gold  was 
. - 
transferred t,o the Treasury) and offered the Reserve Bunks  gold 
certificates in exchange  (ibid.,  p.  63  .  The somewhat cavalier 
procedmes  of the Board  and  the  Treasury with  respect  to the 
Reserve Banks0 gold  in 1933-34 still were regarded as a novelty 
then, but  analogous instances of the use of Reaerve Banks* cash or 
other assets for the  Treasury's  primary befit  have since occurred 
from time to  time; consequently,  Reserve Bank officials  have tended 
to become less sensitive to  the  underlying principles of this issue 
than they formerly were. 
The Gold Reserve Act  established the Exchange .Stabilization 
Fund and  centered,  in the Treasury the direction of United States 
foreign  exchange market intervention (see  Todd [1992al)  . Roosevelt 
also  issued  a  proclamation  under the Act  the following day, 
January 31, 1934, permanently fixing the official price of gold at 
535.00 per ounce, a devaluation of  the dollar to 59.06  percent of 
i:s  pas:-1834 and pre-1933 value of  $20.67  [Blum 119591, p.  123). 
The o:her  no:able  legislative  ' events of 1934 affecting.  Federal 
Reserve operations  before the arrival of  Marriner Eccles were those 
leai~ng  to enactmen:  of  former Section.13b  of  the Federal Reserve 
Arr  !repeaied in  1958, effec:~ve  ln  1959) in the Act  of June 19, 
.  - 
1935.  The  background of  that  statute has been well  summarized 
by Olson  : 
aefsre  his  sudden death  in  1934  [he resigned August  15 to 
resume his dutles as Governor of  the Atlanta Reserve Bank but 
died December 191, Governor Eugene Black frequently protested 
[Jesse]  Jones's  ommpresence in Washington financial circles 
and  how  the  RFC,  not  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  war  the 
dominant  force  in  the  money  markets.  In  New  York,  the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmgovernors  of  the Federal Renerve Bank  [sic], pamiorlarly  - 
George Harrison and Owen Young, expressed similar sentiments. 
During  the  bank  reconstruction process in  the spring 8nd 
summer of 1933, Harrison repeatedly called for an end to RFC 
loans.  Instead, he wanted the Federal Reserve b-  to  make 
the loans with the RFC guaranteeing them.  Jones disagreed and 
prevailed with the president.  While  [presidential advisor8 
Adolph A.  1  Berle,  [~ommyl Corcoran  [general counsel of  the 
RFCI , and Tugwell wanted the  RFC to  become a permanent agency 
controlling the flow of capital throughout the entire economy, 
conservatives [like Jones, Douglas, Postmaster keral  James 
Farley,  and  Senator  ~lassl  wanted  it  to remain purely  a 
temporary, emergency institution.  (Olson [19881, p.  114) 
~t  that  juncture,  in  Ma  1934,  Roosevelt  wrote  to  the 
chairmen of  the House and  Senate banking  committees, expressing 
concern  that  small  businesses  continued  to be  unable  to build 
"working capitalm (Hackley (19731, p.  134).  He apparently used 
this phrase to mean funds available for up.  to five-year terms to 
meet the expenses of investment in equipment and premises (purposes  - 
that ordinarily were ineligible for discount by Reserve Banks under 
Seczion  13 of  the Federal Reserve Act),  and maturities that far 
exceeded :he  90-day limitations under Section 13 and the 120-day 
l  irr,ira=ions  under Seczion 10  (b)  (an  emergency provision originally 
enaczed  in  1932  that  had  been  extended)  id.. The  Board, 
respark-ng  to Roosevelt '  s March letter,  wrote to the Senate Banking 
Comc::=ee  OR April  13, 1934, that it  agreed that there was a need 
"for  =re<:=  facili:ies  for lndust-y and commerce . . .  for  loans to 
~rav:ie  working capital for commerce and industry, and such loans 
netossar~ly  must  have a  longer maturity than those rediocountable 
by  Federal reserve banks" (ibld. . 
She  Board's origlnal vlslon apparently was that the Treasury 
should return to the Board the 5139 million taken from the Reserve 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmBanks'  surplus in early 1934 to fund_ part of  the FDIC's  original 
capital  subscription  and  should  authorize  the  B08rrd,  the 
Reserve Banks, to  organize and  operate  twelve  regional intermediate 
credit banks 'to  discount commercial  paper and make direct loans  of 
up to five years to  -industrya  (Olson (19881  , p.  155)  .  Berle is  . 
credited.  with originating this idea  ibid.  ) , but.  Governor Black 
-.  - 
appears to have been an early convert.- 
~lthough  New Deal planners saw the proposal as an important 
step toward government  control of  the capital markets,  the 
idea had  little support in Congress or in the rest  of  the 
administration. . . .  Berle also wanted the  [intermediate 
credit banks] to  underwrite securities  issues, a move designed 
to shore up the defunct capital markets. . . .  In the (-1 
.  .  . Hugh Johnson and W.E.  Dunn,  RFC-NRA liaison officer, 
were pushing a more ambitious proposal. . . .  They wanted an 
intermediate government credit corporation -- supervised by 
staff members  from  the RFC,  Treasury,  and  Federal Reserve 
Board  [note: nor the Reserve Banks] -- to  purchase marketable 
securities.  (Ibid.  1 
Senator Glass did  not  oppose the idea of a working-capital 
loan facility for the Federal Reserve, but he wanted it  located at 
:he  Reserve Banks in order to  avoid duplication of existing lending 
facil~ties. Jones wanted  the RFC to operate the only working- 
ca~i=al  lending  programs.  Eventually,  bills  embodying - 
~r=pasals  went  to final vozes an  both houses of  Congress.  Some 
congressmen objected tha:  the Reserve Banks should not k  making 
loans  in  nonemergency  circumstances  directly  to  individuals. 
0:hers  did  not  wish to see Reserve Bank credit used as start-up 
cap~zal;  they believed that working-capital loans should be made 
only  to established businesses  (see ibid.,  pp.  156-157; Hackley 
[19731,  pp. 133-1361. 
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expected to take the dominant role in the new industrial lending 
facilities,  with the  RFC making the loans only if the  Reservc Banks 
refused to do 80. (Hackley [19731, p.  136).  There were slight 
dissimilarities in the lending authorities of the two  bodies in the  . 
final  statute  bid  , but  the averlap  of  RFC-Federal Reserve. 
- 
authority  in  this  instance  produced  substantially  different 
outcomes.  Over time, the RFC made most  of  the industrial loans, 
and, in Hackley8s words,  'the  volume of  such loans made by  the 
Federal  Reserve .Banks --  at  first  considerable  --  eventually 
declined  to  an  amount  that  was  almost  negligiblem  (ibid.). 
However,  as  Anna  Schwartz has  noted,  Section  13  although  'a 
departure from  [Federal  ~eservel  traditiona  and by then dead, gave 
rise in later years to the congressional and executive branches8 
idea  :ha:  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  could  serve  as guarantors 
(subjec:  to Treasury reimbursement) for other types of  industrial 
loazs and  could serve as fiscal agents for the Treasury's  myriad 
federal  loan  guarantee  programs  during  and  after  World  War  11 
(Scnwarzz 119921  1 .  In any event. the Reserve Banks'  direct loans 
naer Sez:ion  13b were  limited  to established  businesses, with 
small  j.~stnesses  favored, whlch satisfied one of the corporatist 
ob)  ec=  :ves  of  reducing  and  controlling  competition  in  the 
marke=?lace.  In congressional testimony in 1947, Chairman Ecclea 
said =ha= at  that time. the Reserve Banks had handled 3,'500 loan 
appl:ta=:ons  under  Section 13b, with a cumulative value of $560 
rr.:lllon  (and a  mean  value  of  5160,0001, most  of  them occurring 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbefore  World  War  11,  when  the V-*an  program  of  federal  loan 
guarantees  administered  by  the  Reserve  Banks  became  iraportant 
(Federal  Reserve B-  (19471  ,  vol.  33, p.  522) . 
These.  were the last.  significant legislative developments at 
the ~ederal  Reserve Board before the arrival of Marriner  Eccles and 
Lauchlin Currie in late 1934.  The events of  1934 reflected the 
strains between the competing varieties of corporatism and central 
planning that were present in Washington at the time.  In 1934, it 
appeared  that  the  stronger varieties would  prevail,  but  it  ia 
likely that  the increasing difficulties encountered by  the NWt 
contributed heavily to the Board's  (especially  the Board staff's) 
abandonment of  - openly corporatist solutions in favor of  the new 
approaches advocated by Messrs. Eccles and Currie. 
V.  The Board prepare6 for the coming of Marrher  dcclem at 
the  end  of  1934  and  becomem  a  hybrid  Chicago  Plan-ortbdox . 
Keynesian shop. 
~arrtner  Eccles was born in 1890 into  'a  prominent Utah Mormon 
family :hat  acquired banking intereqts of which the First Security 
Co-zporarion today is the best-known  descendant.  His autobiography 
shouid  be  required  reading  for  all  Federal  Reserve  System 
etonm:s:s  and lawyess, for boch the good and the bad in it, and is 
a valuable source of  ~nf  ormat~on  on the 1930s not found elsewhere 
ln  matnstream  economic literature.  The descriptions of how the 
Eccles family handled depositors' runs on their banks in the  Mormon 
Emp~re  of  the Inrermounra~n  West, in 1930-32,  are among the best of 
the genre  IEccles [1951],  pp. 54-70). 
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Federal Reserve policy and eventually become governor of the Board 
began in Utah in early 1933.  Eccles joined a discussion group in 
Ogden originally called the aFriedenkersr (free-thinkers), one of 
whose members was Robert ~inckley,  a local busiries-  who was a, 
regent of the  University of Utah.  At Hinckley's  invitation, Eccles 
attended  economic  lectures  by  guest  speakers  sponsored  by  the 
university in Salt Lake City and in that way rn*  Paul  Douglas, then 
a teacher at the University of Chicago, who gave a lecture in  Salt 
Lake City.  In February 1933, Eccles was invited to  accompany one 
of the speakers, Stuart Chase, to lunch.  Over lunch, he explained 
his own theories-  of how to tope with the depression to  Chase, who 
suggested that, the next time Eccles was in the East, he should go 
New  York  and  talk 
University professor. 
with  Rexf  ord 
fate would 
then  Columbia 
have it, Eccles was scheduled 
to appear before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in late 
February, and  he  agreed  to go  on  to New  York  to meet  Tugwell 
.  (ibid.,  pp.  85-87). 
Eccles'  testimony before  the  committee  included  his  usual 
ideas, which fairly could be  regarded as Keynesian, on having the 
federal  government incur a budget deficit deliberately in order to 
provide fiscal stimulus to the economy.  Eccles also supported 8 
federal bank-deposit garantee law  (to  be funded by an assessment 
of the banks), a 52.5 billion payment by the federal government to 
deposirors of  failed banks, Henry Wallace's  domestic production 
allotment plan to raise agricultural prices (later  embodied in the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm~gricultural  Adjustment Act  of  My  -  12,  19331,  and  a  permanent 
settlement  of  the  interallied  debts  from  World  War  I,  with 
cancellation  preferred.  Then  he  knt  to  meet Tugwell (ibid., 
pp.  104-113). 
When they met in New York, kfore  Inauguration Day in 1933, 
~ccles  gave  hrgwell  a  copy  of-his  Senate .committee  testimony. 
ntgwell apparently  expressed to  Eccles his fear "that the system of 
private  enterprise  had  outdated  itself  and  that  governmental 
control.  of the whole economic plant in an immediate and direct way 
might be necessarya (ibid., pp. 114-115).  After the inauguration, 
Eccles  corresponded with  acquaintances in Washington  about  U.s 
ideas on what ought to be done.  He sent a telegram to Senator  John 
Townsend  supporter 
aavocazing a SS billion 
inflationary  f  inance  1  April 
Treasury bond issue  purchased in ito 
enzirety by  the Federal Reserve in order to  bring about "controlled 
ir.fla:ionN  (ibid., pp.  122-1231.  Eccles was skeptical regarding 
=he viability and theoretical soundness of the NRA, believing that 
1:  tenoed to promote monopolistic practices (price  cartels) and did 
Ir::ie  :o  relieve the suffering  of the unemployed.  The NRA,  Eccles 
though:.  would  cause  an  "inventory  boomm  without  increasing 
ag;rc?a:e  purchasing paver  (ibid., pp. 125-1261. 
Araund Oczober 10, 193  3, Jesse Jones telephoned First Security 
to  reques:  that  E.G.  Bennett,  one  of  Eccles'  colleagues  in 
managemen=, take the vacanr Republican director's  seat at the RFC. 
Tugwell, =hen in Washington, separately asked Eccles to come East 
for another discussion.  Arriving around November 1, Eccles met 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTugwell at  the Department of Agridt-,  and they agreed to  have 
dinner that night at the Shoreham Hotel with Wenry Wallace, Ham 
Hopkins  , Jerome Frank, and Georgt Dern (ibid.,  pp.  128-131)  . The 
. -  ..>.. 
Washington officials  were ready to  receive-  the gospel of unbalanced 
budgets from its foremost western preacher. 
[Tlhey  needed more than the.  doctrine of Cbriotiaa charity to 
advance what they wanted to  do an the face of strong  political 
resistance.  They needed arguments  on  how a planned policy of 
adequate  deficit  financing  -  could  serve  the  humanitarian 
objective with which they were most directly concerned; and 
second, how the increased production and employment that the 
policy would create was the only way  a depression could be 
ended and a budget balanced.  (Ibid., p.  131) 
The dinner group decided that Eccles should work on Treasury 
Undersecretary Dean Acheson, who was  "open to argumentn on the 
balanced-budget question.  Eccles believed that his arguments did- 
win Acheson over to his side,  but Acheson resigned and was replaced 
by Morgenthau a few weeks later.  Then Eccles met Secretary  of the 
Interior Harold Ickes  ,  who apparently wanted  to ask him  to take . . 
cnarse  of  the adminis:ra:ion*s  public housing program.  Eccles 
returned to Utah but, in mid-December 1933, he was asked to return 
to Washing:an  the following month to meet with Morgenthau, the'new 
Treaszry  secretary.  A  few  weeks  later,  he  was  offered  (and 
accepted)  a  posi:lon  as  assistant  to  Morgenthau  in  charge  of 
mone:a-y  and credit ma=:ers,  beginning February 1, 1934, So last 
until June 1935  (ibid.,  pp. 136-1431. 
By March 1934, Eccles was working as Morgenthau8s  liaispn to  - 
the a5~rnistration  comrni:=ees  working on housing matters.  There he 
met  win?  ield Riefler, a Board  economist who had been working on 
legislative matters since early 1932.  Riefler, Eccles, and others, 
SO 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmworking together  on the President's  EmcrrgaCy Committee  on  Housing, 
established the Federal Housing Authority in June 1934.  Riefler 
devised the principle of'  the federal loan guarantee for housing, 
later  used  in  a  host  of  federal lending programs (ibid., pp. 
In June 1934, Eugene Black resigned as governor of the Board. 
~orgenthau  told Eccles in  st  that he had put fomard  Ecclese 
name  to Roosevelt  as Black's  replacement.  In September, at  a 
meeting  with  Roosevelt,  Eccles  said  that  he  would  accept  the 
appointment  only  if  fundamental  changes  were  made  in  the 
organizational structure of  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  Whcn 
Roosevelt asked what the nature of  those changes might be, Eccles 
asked  for  a  month's  delay to prepare  a memorandum  of  requested 
changes.  Eccles wrote  : 
[Ilt was  not  until  November  4  [1934] that  I  had  another 
mee:ing  with the President.  I brought to it a memorandum I 
had prepared in the meantime with the help of Lauchlin  Curtie, 
:nen  a member of  the "Freshman Brain Trust  in the  .Treasury 
Dcpar:ment.  This memorandum, which led to the Banking Act of 
1935, is now deposited among the Roosevelt papers.  It should 
have  more  than passing  interest  to the  historians of  the 
epoch. .  (Ibid.,  pp. 365-1661 
f ,-.see;,. 
p..  ---  PC.  - ,e,  a Ha-varQ  3c:versr:y  associate professor, already was 
re=ag.-.:zed  as  one  of  Amcrlca's  foremost  Keynesian  economists. 
C~rrre  appears to be  the principal source of  one of Eccles'  pet 
zhear~es,  which was char, for effective monerary control, it wan 
necessary to cen:ralite  :he  con:rol  of :he  creation of money in one 
~oay.  Cusrie advocated :hat  such a body have no more than three or 
four  policymakess (Phillips  [I9931 ;  Currie (1934  1 , p. 159)  .  Eccles 
51 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmrecounts that he put foward this idea.  -  dubg  &s  November 4,  1934 
presentation to Roosevelt: 
[After  describing the capacity of the twelve Reserve Banks to 
obstruct policies desired by the Board)  A more effective way  -. 
of  diffusing  responsibility  and  encouraging  inertia  and 
indecision could not  very well  have been devised.  Yet  it 
seemed to suit  the New York Federal Reserve Bank,  through 
which private interests in the New York financial district 
exercised such enormous influence over the national economy. 
Ref  om  of  the  foregoing  situation  was  clearly  indicated. 
Responsibility over open-mket  operations had to  be unified. 
in  character  and  vested  in a  clearly  identifiable body. 
(Eccles [1951], p.  171) 
~t was Eccles*  belief, in  which Currie, a native of Canada who 
did  not  fully appreciate the  . constitutional merits of  the U.S. 
system of checks and balances, apparently concurred (Currie  [1934], 
p.  156) that  . 
Over the years, practices had grown up inside the  System  which 
had reduced the Reserve Board in Washington to  impotence.  The 
syszem had  criginally been designed to represent a blend of 
prlvace  and  public  interests  and  of  decentralized  and 
cenzralized  authorities,  but  this  arrangement  had  become 
unbalanced.  Private  interests, acting through the Reserve 
Banks, had made the System an effective instrument by  which 
przvate  interests  alone  could  be  served.  The  Board  in 
Washington.,  on the ocher hand, which was supposed to  represent 
and  safeguard the  public  interest, was powerless to do  so 
under  the  existing  law  and  in  the  face of  the opposition 
offered by  =he me3 who ran the Reserve Banks throughout the 
couzzry.  (Ec=les  119511. p.  166.) 
3esries  reoryaalring :he  relazionship between  the Board and  the 
Reserve aaaks, Eccles wanzed =o  expand the effective eligibility  of 
banks' asse:s  to  serve as col1a:eral  for borrowings at the Reserve 
Banks  and  even  to  deleze  =he  exis:ing  eligibility  provisions  '- 
(5  . , p. 17  1 .  In the end, the compromise effected  was to retain 
:he  exls:ing  eligibill=y  language  but  to  make  permanent 
Sec=lon  20  (b)  ,  added  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  in 1932. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmSection  10  (b) authorized  Reserve  Banks  to lead  on  any  "sound 
assetsm without  regard to 'the  narrow form or calcndu date of 
maturitym of  aos.ts  (ibid., p.  172). 
Roosevelt listened to Eccles~  presentation of the memorandum 
for two hours and then told him that he would nominate him to k , 
Governor of the Board.  The appointment was announced November lo, 
9  (ibid., p.  175)  . ,  ~f  f  ective November 15,  '~ccles  was appointed 
a member of the Board and was designated governor; Lauchlin -ie 
"was appointed by the Board as assistant director of the Division 
of Research and Statistics. . . .  [I]  t is contemplated that the 
work of the division involving research in the monetary field will 
come under Dr. Curriem (ibid.  1 .  On December 1, Lawrence Clayton, 
a lifelong friend of Eccles from Utah, was appointed assistant to 
=he  governor, functioning  as his principal administrative  assistant 
(fedoral  [1934],  vol.  20, p.  779; Eccles [1951]  , 
up.  25-31).  The stage was set for the Board to become the focus of 
=he  etonomic and legislative  drama of the second half of the 1930s, 
featuring  the  Banking-  Act  of  1935,  the  doubling '  of  reserve 
re~~irements  in 1936-37,  the overhaul of discount-window  policies, 
an5 =fie regulatory agreement of 1938 (see  Philzips 11993)  ;  Schiming 
!l9531;  Simonson and Hempel  (1993)). 
.  Conclumim:  The  Board  abmorbed  and  reflected the idmrm 
current in Wrmhington  at the  time. 
I.-. =he history of  polirical economy theory, it  generally is 
bqlieved that a taste for centralization of authority, cooperation 
and  information-sharing  to  reduce  competition,  restraint  of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmproduction'  to maintain prices and pr~fits,  md  the coercion of 
labor  by the state into conformance with this design, all die hard 
once they become embedded in the administrative apparatus of the 
.A 
state.  The occasional reappearance and even persistence of some 
mildly  corporatist  ideas at  the Board siace the 1930s might .b;t ,- 
explained by  the hypothesis that such ideas,  once having gained 
sway there in 1931-34, simply  have reappeared whenever the  economic 
' 
and political  conditions were right.  The post-1934 melding  of 
those ideas with the Eccles-Currie hybrid Keynesian model  (-ie 
in particular being a strong proponent of some of the ideas of the 
Chicago Plan  for  100 percent  reserves banking)  might  not  have 
altered  the  corporatist  conceptions  of  key  staff  members,  or 
tempered their influence well into the 1940s, as much as one might 
think. 
For example. E.A.  Goldenweiser, the director of the Board's 
research and  statistics division during the period studied here  , 
was no fascist, but  he  presided  over or participated'  in all: the 
events described in  this paper.  He joined the Board's  staff.  in 
1919,  became  director  of  research  in  1927,  remaining'  in  that 
pasir~c,r,  un:il  2945.  and  retired  in  1946. .  In  November  1944i 
snar:ly  before his rezlrement. he  gave a speech anticipating the 
poszGar system of govemmen=al regulation, planning, guarantees, 
and  cor.:rols  that he thought necessary to sustain the peacetime 
convezs:an  of  the domes:~c  economy.  The speech reflects lkssons 
learned  from  the  NRA  experience:  He  wanted  to  increase,  not 
rehuce, industrial competition in order to hold prices down.  for 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexample, and to encourage labor to organize indepcadeatly so as to 
defend its own interests.  But the spcech also display.  a failure 
to  learn  other  lessons  from  the  1931-34  era.  For  uumple, 
Goldenweiser advocated that the  federal  -government  provide a  system 
of  9arantees  for  individual citizenso  standard of living, together 
with the  regulations and  controls necessary  to achieve such a 
living  standard  (see  Federal Reserve Buleta [19451, wl.  31, 
pp.  112-121).  Walter Wyatt,  like Goldenweiser, was a long-time 
senior Board staff member who played a prominent role in  the events 
of 1931-34 and who remained in his position until after World War 
If.  Wyatt  joined the Board  in 1917, became general counsel in 
1922, and  retired  in  1946.  The  director  of  research and  the 
general counsel had great influence at  the Board during and afser 
1931, and  their successors in  office  exercise  comparably great 
i~fluence  today.  Surely the experiences of Goldenweiser and Wyatt 
in the early 1930s must have colored the advice they gave to Eccles 
and k~s  assiscants throughout the rest of  their careers. 
Most  the  intellectual  sponsorship  increased central 
pia~zlng  and directLon of  Federal Reserve System policies, as well 
as  =he  "moral  suaslon"  used  against  regional  Reserve  Banks' 
Z~ssez:,  usually are :raced  back to the early efforts of Marriner 
Etcles and  Uuchlrn Currle at  the Board after November 1934  bee 
Schlming  [19931).  The  dominant  role  of  the Federal Reserve  in 
formulating bank supervisory policy usually is traced back to the 
efforts of  Eccles and Leo Paulger, the chief bank examiner, in 1937 
and 1938  (see  Simonson and Hempel  (19931). 
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framework for  ,and  precedents  affecting  current  ~ederal  Renerve 
lending policies were created during the period in question, 1931- 
34, with only minor changes after  -  Qwernor-  Eccles arrived on the 
scene.  It  is not  my  contention  that  increased open-market  or 
lending operations by the Reserve ~ankd  during that period would 
have been a bad  idea from a strictly quantitative perspective or 
that  they  would  have  failed  to  '  alleviate  some  unnecessary 
suffering;  rather,  I  am  contending  that,  irrespective  of  the 
potential quantitative outcomes, the underlying motives  for the 
initiatives that actually were attempted before Eccles and Currie 
arrived were primarily corporatist.  Thus, those initiatives ought 
to  have  been  suspect  and  still  should  be  suspect  whenever  the 
s=azuzory  legacy  of  1931-34  is  invoked  in  emergency  lending 
sizuations  today.  Interestingly,  the  Federal  Reserve  Act 
amtr.5mer.z~  enacted during this period have commonly been treated in 
wask:r:;==n  as  received  =ruth, with  little  or  no  suspicion  of 
co,-poza=  is:  :sin=,  even  though  the  philosophical  and  economf  c 
theory bases of  those s:a=utes  appeared to be  completely at  odds 
wizf. :he  ;rrnriples  of  laisset faire and increased competition that 
---3ar:ly  found favor in Washington after 1980 or so. 
Wile  memaries were still fresh, it was generally understood  .  - 
:ha=  :hese  1931-34 statuzes and policy initiatives were logically 
in=ans:s=en=  with competizive, laissez-faire  notions.  For  example, 
=he Federal Advisory Council made the following recomendat~ion  on 
September 18, 1934, at  the close of  the period studied here: 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe Council feels that 8  careful distinctioa should be made 
bctween  fundamental changes in-the  Federal  Reserve System 
itself  and  those  remedial  changes which  are  necessary  or 
desirable as a result of inconsistencies and lack of clarity 
inevitably  resulting  from  the  haste  with  which  important 
emergency  legislation  was  enacted  in  recent  sessions  of 
congress.  In view of the careful study, the prolonged debate 
and the thorough  consideration  which were given to  the subject 
before the Federal Reserve Act.was  adopted in 1914, the . . . 
council  is convinced  of  the importance  of  having  the  act 
carefully reviewed prior to-further  fundamental alterations.. 
-  (Board  of Governors, m-  11934) , p.  204) 
~t  might  be well to exercise a comparable degree of caution with 
respect  to  novel  interpretations  of  long-settled  statutory 
doctrines today, when the relevant memories no longer are fresh. 
The wisdom of reflecting carefully  before acting is illustrated by 
the  following passage  from  Hannah Arendt's  magnum  opus on  the 
problem of  totalitarianism, where she notes the persistence over 
:ime  of political economy models long thought dead: 
[:]here  remains the fact that the crisis of our time and its 
central experience have brought forth an entirely new form of 
a3vernment  -  which as a potentiality and an ever-present danger' 
1s only too likely to stay with us from now on, just as other 
1  f3ms  of  governmen:  which came about at  different historical  . 
rcoments and rested ,on  different fundamental experiences have 
s:ayed  with  mankind  regardless  of  temporary  defeats 
-- monarchies, and  republics, tyrannies, dictatorships, and 
aespo:ism.  '  (Arend:  [I9731  , p.  478) 
-..-.  --,-ng  :he  period szudied here, a generally classical liberal 
.  - 
w=r-z  v:ew  was  supplar.:ed  by  a  rather  strong conception of  the 
r=r?=ra:e  s:ate  wizhin 1mpor:ant  Washington institutions, including 
:he  Federal  Reserve  Board.  The  appeal  of  such  corporatist 
pol:r:ral  economy  models  to the Board  and  to  its senior staff 
d..-. ..  :he  1930s was unaers:andable  in the context of the time and 
.. 
piace and, more than anything else, probably reflected a sense of 
urgency to do something, almost anything, to get the U.S.  economy 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmmoving  forward again.  Eccles and mie  -  dragged the Board away 
from the corporatist world view  (which might  have -iohed  even 
without  their intervention because of  the general disrepute into 
which the NRA was sliding by the time they arrived at  the Board) 
and  toward  what  one.of my  colleag~cs  has  termed  *a Keynesian 
aggregate interventionist sensibilitym instead.  But both before.  . 
and after  becoming ensconced at the Board, Eccles tended to  succumb 
to the temptation to centralize power within the Federal Reserve 
System  at  the  Board  and  at  the  expense  of  the Reserve  Banks, 
without  entirely.dismantling the corporatist  structures created 
within the System between 1931 and 1934. 
Bearing  mind  Hannah  warning,  helpful 
become aware of what actually happened at  the Board during 1931-34 
and  ro understand why events took place the way they did.  It  is 
necessary  to  remain  watchfully  wary  regarding  similar  policy 
res?ozses to present and future events if the System and the nation 
spared  of reliving the worst aspects  this 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix:  What  Berbart  Howor  mad  WItrhu  Icclrs Lnw  about 
political ocoao=y 
It  may  appear to some readers that  the distinctions among 
classical liberalism, corporatism, and  orthodox Keynesianism are 
imperfectly drawn  in this paper.  In this regard,  it  might  be 
helpful  to refer to the definitions of  these terms in the New 
Palaravc  and  also  to  the  definitions  there  of  'liberalismw 
(Dahrendorf (19871  and wlibertym  .  (Ryan [I9871  ) . 
To construct from the palarave working definitions of these 
terms for the purposes of this paper, it is -enough  to state that  . 
modern classical liberalism began in the revolutions  and civil  wars 
of  Great  Britain  in  the  seventeenth century and  maintains  the 
sanctity of  individual political  and  economic liberty under the 
rule of  law.  Liberty or freedom, in turn, is a negative concept: 
the absence of  coercion,  or what Senator Robert A.  Taft called the 
"liberry of the individual to think his own thoughts and live his 
own  life  as  he  desires  to  think  and  livem  (quoted in  Kennedy 
[:9621  ,  p.  2351..  Economic  liberty  ordinarily  would  require 
observance  of  the  principles.  of  free  trade  and  the  absence  of 
pro=e=:lon  and subsidy. 
Crrfi05~x  Kevnosia~ism appears  to  be  derived  from  liberai 
pr:x:ples,  bu:  Robbins  ((L9351,  pp. 145-1461  disputes this point 
and places it  much closes to central planning than to any liberal 
~dea.  Keynesian gove=-nmen:al  inte-vent ions restrict the  operations 
of  che  market  as  a  consequence  of  deliberate  economic  policy 
aczions of the central government; unless carefully circumscribed, 
such  intenrentions  can  become  the  normal  policy  instrument of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcentral  planning, which was Bobbiru'  (1934)  -  point, and also Hayekes 
(1944)  .  (See  also.  Kowalik  [I9871 on .central  planning. .) 
Cornoratism  or  comarate  statism  is  'a  set  of  political 
doctrines  aimed  at  organizing  civil  society  on  the  basis  of 
professional  and occupational representation in chambers  called 
Estates or Corporations . . . [maintaining]  that class conflict is 
not  inherent in the capitalist system of production and ownership 
relations.  Corporatism  has  its  ideological  roots  mainly  in 
nineteenth-century French and Italian Catholic social thought, as 
well  as  in  German  romanticism  and  idealisma  (Halevi  [ig87]). 
Berlin finds that the origins of corporatism in nineteenth-century 
continental European Catholic social thought were derived from the 
wri:ings  of the French legitimist exile, Joseph de Maistre, who 
placed  power at  the top of  his scale of  values  and derived his 
ideal  social structure from Plato's  council of  guardians in 
.~e~ubl:-,,  "a vision . . . detestable to those who truly value human 
freo5orr." (Beslin  [19921, pp.  170-174; see  also  Gide  and  Rist 
[19:3]  . pp. 483-515. for a his~ory  of  similar economic doctrines 
The  decline  of  classical  liberalism  in  English  political 
e=ar,~my  preceded. an5 may have been a principal cause of, the final 
expanslor, of  =he Br2::sh  Empire  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
cen:ury  (see, among  ozhers.  Pakenham  [1991);  Hodgart  [1977], 
pp. 25-43; Dangerfield  (19701  ; Hobson  (1965)  , pp.  94-109).  The 
mains:ream  views of the Founding Fathers of the United States were 
class~=ally  liberal.  Some  of  them  read  Adam  Smith,  and  the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmuofbar ufaaunoutraauf  aqa  ut suotaouasqo auapuadapu~  uo  paseq aran 
6urpu-  a3afiap pue  6utuuofd anoqe  stzap?  ,ue?saUI(ax,  UMO  sjq =e~a 
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1.  Alternative names for the earlier aad simpler focms  of 
this  political  economy  model  include  Christian  soci.lism, 
b 
corporativism, or corporatism, but  there are subtle distinctions 
among these three terms.  It is generally acknowledged that, for  . 
Americans, Benito Mussolini8  s rise  to  power in Italy (1922 was the 
event that.focused  public attention on his brand of corporativism, 
which he  called Fascism.  See Chernow  (1990), esp.  pp.  277-286; 
Trevelyan  (1993)  ; Weber  (1994).  For  a  good  summary  of  the 
attributes of corporatism, see Halevi  (1987)  .  For  the  origins 
of modern  corporatism,  see  Berlin  (19921,  pp.  91-174;  Bada 
(1975)  ,  esp.  pp. 56-57;  Arendt  (1973)  , esp. pp. 267-459;  'and  Gide 
and Risz  (1913)  , esp. pp. 483-515.  For useful distinctions  between 
corporatism and patrimonialism as practiced in Latin America, see 
Penna  (1988)  , pp. 137-163.  For an analysis of how the corporate 
s=a=e  might  be  manifested  in  the United States today, see Gross 
ll986-1  .  For  an  exzremely  useful comparative  analysis  of  the 
evolution of  fascism in Izaly and Germany, albeit one written from 
a  Marxisz  perspective, see Guerln  (1939)  .  For  a contemporary 
ar=:=le  13 a  on "Reserve Bank Policy and Economic Planning,.  see 
Reed  (1933). 
2.  See Clarkson  (1924);  Tansill  (19381,  pp.  79-81, 90-113; 
fhernov (1990),  pp.  186-191;  Dos P~SSOS  (19621,  pp-  220-227- 
3.  Lippmann mainzained a generally positive view of economic 
plazr.:n?  during the Hoover-New  Deal years.  See generally Lippmann 
(1034  1 ,  a book drawn from Lippmann*  s ~odkin  Memorial Lectures at 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmHarvard  University,  and  Lippma~  ([19331,  pp.  330-3341,  .The 
Question of  a.  Planned Society,'  in which he properly  =presses 
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